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A THEORY OF CIVIL PROBLEM-SOLVING 
COURTS 
JESSICA K. STEINBERG* 
This Article is the first to develop a problem-solving theory for the civil 
justice system. Drug courts pioneered the problem-solving model in the 
1990s to pursue therapeutic goals as an alternative to “assembly line” jail-
based sentencing. This Article explores the potential for migration of the 
drug court framework into the two most commonly adjudicated private law 
cases: rental housing and consumer debt. 
Three structural conditions in the civil courts—systemic lack of 
counsel, high-volume dockets, and corporate capture of the small claims 
process—routinely position vulnerable classes of individuals on the losing 
end of litigation. In the aggregate, these conditions have rendered the civil 
justice system predictably ineffective in combatting recurring social issues 
such as substandard housing and unscrupulous debt collection. The heart of 
the problem-solving theory in drug courts is the availability of an alternative 
remedy: treatment over prison. In civil courts, the remedy itself is not 
necessarily deficient; it is access to the remedy that is compromised. Relying 
on two years of field research in an experimental court, this Article 
demonstrates how core drug court principles, such as naming the purpose of 
the court as solving a social problem, interdisciplinary collaboration, and a 
strong judicial role, can be manipulated to address process failures in the 
civil justice system and reimagine the courts as proactive institutions 
responsible for the pursuit of socially beneficial outcomes. 
The Article also argues that a civil problem-solving theory survives 
many of the valid critiques levied against drug courts. In particular, drug 
courts have come under fire for playing a moralizing role and using 
compulsory treatment as a form of social control. A civil problem-solving 
court, however, would not exacerbate the negative impact of state power on 
already over-burdened groups. Instead, the targets of monitoring and 
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behavior modification are the more powerful private actors to the litigation, 
such as property owners and debt buyers, who otherwise have been known 
to manipulate the courts—an instrument of the state—to evade their legal 
obligations and suppress individual rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1990s, judges dissatisfied with the mass processing of criminal 
cases launched the problem-solving movement following the introduction of 
the first drug court.1 The drug court model is now firmly embedded within 
the criminal justice system and has spawned a range of problem-solving 
courts serving low-level offenders in areas such as mental health, veteran’s 
affairs, and community reentry for formerly incarcerated citizens.2 This 
Article explores the potential for migration of the drug court framework into 
the civil arena. It demonstrates that, with certain adaptations, the drug court 
philosophy may be an effective tool in bringing the judicial system to bear 
on some of the unique structural injustices that pervade private law cases and 
have impaired the civil courts’ ability to disrupt recurring social problems. 
A civil problem-solving model may also sidestep many of the legitimate 
critiques that have plagued drug courts and provide a forum for much-needed 
innovation in the role of the civil judge. 
Drug courts are grounded in principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, a 
theory centered on the consequences of a legal decision or the relationship 
of the law to social effects.3 Typically, a defendant charged with a low-level 
drug offense is diverted away from the conventional court process, where 
punishment is the focus, and instead opts into an alternative process where 
treatment is the focus.4 
Every drug court is unique and adapted to the population it serves, but 
the model embraces a number of common principles. The first is that the 
court names its primary purpose as addressing the underlying social problem 
of drug use that is seen as a contributory factor in recidivism.5 A second 
common principle is the interdisciplinary team approach.6 Outside experts, 
treatment providers, and service providers often work together with the judge 
to develop goals and implement a drug treatment regimen. Last, drug courts 
 
 1  Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal 
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1605 (2012).  
 2  DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, CAROLYN D. HARDIN & CARSON L. FOX, NAT’L DRUG COURT 
INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7, 9 (2016).  
 3  See Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice 
System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 446 (1999) 
(contrasting therapeutic jurisprudence with “traditional” jurisprudence, which is insensitive to the 
consequences of a decision). 
 4  See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1605–07 (describing the origins and common characteristics 
of drug courts). 
 5  See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAW & 
POL’Y 125, 131 (2001).  
 6  MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 11, 28, 66.  
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are outcome driven, rather than focused on formal procedures. Judges 
closely monitor cases with regular hearings and often employ a system of 
graduated sanctions and rewards to promote compliance.7 The problem-
solving approach pioneered by drug courts is intended to address root causes 
of crime in ways that “assembly line” adjudication has failed to do.8 
Notably, outside of family law matters, the problem-solving model has 
barely cracked the civil sphere. Traditional adjudication retains a near-
exclusive grip on the resolution of private law disputes despite the fact that, 
much like the criminal courts, the civil courts contend with a range of 
intractable social problems that are often left unsolved by conventional 
processes.9 
To take one example, tenants have long struggled to challenge 
substandard housing conditions in the courts.10 Landlords prosecute claims 
for unpaid rent with ease, but tenants are rarely successful in enforcing their 
corollary rights to habitable living conditions. In a second example, fraud 
and abuse in consumer debt matters run rampant in the civil courts.11 Debt 
buyers aggressively pursue collection on debt that is of unknown origin, is 
barred by time limitations, or has already been discharged through 
bankruptcy or other means.12 Even where the law should ostensibly protect 
their assets, consumers are often subject to judgments that destroy their credit 
and result in garnishment of their wages and bank accounts. 
This Article contends that a set of structural forces unique to the civil 
courts renders traditional adjudication predictably ineffective in resolving 
certain recurring social problems. Relying on substandard housing and 
consumer protection as two prominent illustrations, this Article examines 
three systemic issues that undermine the courts’ ability to address significant 
social issues. First, the civil courts are now beset by an unrepresented 
majority. While criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to counsel, 
civil parties are not, and publicly funded attorneys are increasingly scarce. 
 
 7  Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131–32.  
 8  Cf. id. at 130 (quoting Patrick McGrath, a deputy district attorney, as expressing 
dissatisfaction with the “assembly line” approach to adjudication).  
 9  See infra Part II. 
 10  See, e.g., PUB. JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE DIVERTED: HOW RENTERS ARE PROCESSED IN THE 
BALTIMORE CITY RENT COURT 14-23 (2015); David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied 
Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389, 406–07 (2011). 
 11  See LISA STIFLER & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, DEBT 
COLLECTION AND DEBT BUYING: THE STATE OF LENDING IN AMERICA AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. 
HOUSEHOLDS 8–14 (2014).  
 12  See Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults, and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection 
Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 257, 263–73 (2011) (providing an 
overview of the consumer debt collection industry and its history).  
Forthcoming, 93 NYU L. Rev. __ (2018) 
 
As an aggravating condition, lopsided representation, in which one party has 
counsel and the other does not, is increasingly common. Tenants and 
consumers, for example, are typically represented by counsel in less than ten 
percent of matters, while property owners and debt collectors have counsel 
in up to ninety percent of cases.13 Unrepresented parties struggle immensely 
with issues of procedure and legal relevance, and often cannot compete with 
their represented counterparts in developing the evidence necessary to 
vindicate meritorious claims. With consistently low representation rates 
among defined classes of litigants, the civil courts become unreliable forums 
for the enforcement of particular rights. 
Second, the explosion of high-volume dockets in the civil courts 
parallels the crush of cases in the criminal courts, and perhaps is even a more 
pressing problem. Partly as a result of high caseloads, most civil litigants 
never see a judge or have any genuine access to an adjudicatory process. In 
housing cases, for example, default judgments resolve up to fifty or sixty 
percent of matters, subjecting tenants to forcible eviction and substantial 
damages without any consideration of valid defenses such as the poor 
condition of the rental unit.14 In addition, most tenants who “litigate” their 
claims are directed to the hallway of the courthouse to sign a perfunctory 
settlement with their landlord’s attorney, typically without any judicial 
oversight or exchange of evidence.15 Furthermore, the courts are ill-equipped 
to handle even the volume of cases that survive both default judgment and 
unbalanced settlement negotiations. A number of researchers have 
documented trials that last less than five minutes,16 as well as crowded 
dockets in which one hundred housing matters are heard by a single court in 
a single day.17 
Last, small claims courts within the civil justice system have been 
captured by powerful corporations, undermining the promise of a flexible 
procedural regime to protect the rights of ordinary litigants.18 Small claims 
judges have broad powers to elicit facts and interrogate the authenticity of 
 
 13  Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 
741, 750 (2015). 
 14  See infra Part II. 
 15  See infra Part II.  
 16  See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S 
EVICTION COURT 11–12 (2003) (finding that the average time per case was one minute and forty-
four seconds); THE WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, INJUSTICE IN NO TIME: THE 
EXPERIENCE OF TENANTS IN MARICOPA COUNTY JUSTICE COURTS 9 (2005) (stating that the 
typical court would dispose of thirty to sixty eviction cases in sixty minutes or less).  
 17  Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a 
Problem-Solving Housing Court, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058, 1065 (2017) (up to 100 cases a 
day are docketed on the District of Columbia’s landlord-tenant calendar). Similar conditions plague 
consumer matters. See BRIAN STAUFFER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RUBBER STAMP JUSTICE: US 
COURTS, DEBT BUYING CORPORATIONS, AND THE POOR 3–4 (2016).  
 18  See infra Part II.  
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claims, but only rarely exercise that power.19 In the debt context, for 
example, the deep-seated adversarial tradition of a passive judge, coupled 
with the procedural informality of the small claims system, has laid the 
groundwork for debt collectors to perpetrate consumer fraud with impunity. 
One common tactic is “sewer service,” a practice in which the debt collector 
intentionally fails to serve the consumer with court papers, but then asserts 
to the court that service has been perfected in order to secure an uncontested 
default judgment.20 A second is “robo-signing,” a practice in which the debt 
collector attests to facts about an underlying debt in an affidavit without any 
verification of the veracity of the claims.21 Judges, trained by adversary 
culture to “referee” rather than examine, rarely question the legitimacy of 
such practices, even in informal courts that may permit such intervention. 
This Article argues that the structural failings of traditional civil 
adjudication invite consideration of drug court principles. At its best, the 
drug courts’ problem-solving philosophy reimagines the courts as proactive 
institutions responsible for the pursuit of socially beneficial outcomes. This 
Article argues that implementation of a problem-solving framework, in 
certain appropriate circumstances, may position the civil courts to more 
effectively address a series of social problems that arise repeatedly in the 
private law arena. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the conditions that 
gave rise to the drug court movement in the criminal courts and describes the 
key characteristics of the problem-solving model. Using the lens of the two 
most commonly adjudicated civil issues—rental housing and consumer 
debt—Part II then reveals different, but analogous, conditions in the civil 
courts that may justify importation of problem-solving principles into private 
law matters. 
Part III develops a theory for adapting drug court methods to the civil 
arena. In criminal courts, the heart of the problem-solving model is the 
availability of an alternative remedy: treatment over prison. In civil courts, 
the remedy itself is not necessarily deficient; indeed, housing codes and 
consumer protection laws are already, in many ways, quite robust. Instead, 
it is access to available remedies that is lacking. A civil problem-solving 
court must therefore exploit the drug court philosophy to address process 
failure and achieve three goals: (1) motivate judges to protect vulnerable 
 
 19  See infra Part II.  
 20  See Lisa Stifler, Debt in the Courts: The Scourge of Abusive Debt Collection Litigation and 
Possible Policy Solutions, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 107 (2017) (defining “sewer service”). 
 21  See id. at 104–05 (defining “robo-signing”). 
Forthcoming, 93 NYU L. Rev. __ (2018) 
 
court users; (2) attack information asymmetry; and (3) monitor liable parties 
to induce performance. Relying on extensive field work in an experimental 
housing court in the District of Columbia, this Part demonstrates how core 
problem-solving principles—a named intent to solve a social problem, 
interdisciplinary collaboration, and a strong judicial role—can further these 
process-oriented goals and create a model for civil problem-solving 
experimentation. Notwithstanding legitimate challenges to scaling and 
sustaining civil problem-solving courts, which Part III also addresses, the 
model offers an opportunity to pilot much-needed innovation in the role of 
the civil judge and holds promise for improving process legitimacy in private 
law matters. 
In Part IV, I argue that problem-solving courts in the civil law setting 
may sidestep many of the long-standing critiques of the drug court model in 
the criminal arena, including responsibilization,22 net widening, and 
diminished procedural protections. In criminal courts, drug courts play a 
moralizing role and may inadvertently expand the reach of the criminal 
justice system while at the same time disposing of defendants’ constitutional 
rights. In civil cases, however, the problem-solving model would not 
exacerbate the negative impact of state power on already over-burdened 
groups. Instead, the targets of monitoring and behavior modification are 
powerful private actors, such as landlords and debt buyers, who may 
otherwise manipulate the courts—an instrument of the state—to evade their 
legal obligations and suppress individual rights. 
I 
DRUG COURTS AND THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PHILOSOPHY 
The first drug court opened in Miami in 1989, and since then, the 
problem-solving model has risen to prominence in criminal courts 
throughout the country.23 Now, there are nearly 3000 drug courts, as well as 
more than a thousand problem-solving courts devoted to mental health, 
veteran’s affairs, reentry, domestic violence, and homelessness.24 Although 
drug courts vary in philosophy and execution,25 certain core principles 
apply.26 First, drug courts name their purpose as solving a social problem 
 
 22  See infra Section IV.A (discussing “responsibilization,” a term critiquing the government 
for playing a moralizing role in its approach to substance abuse by foisting responsibility on the 
defendant to treat his own addiction). 
 23  James L. Nolan, Jr., Therapeutic Adjudication, 39 SOC’Y 29, 29 (2002).  
 24  MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 7, 9, 12.  
 25  See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1611–44 (discussing various philosophies and approaches 
employed by drug courts, including therapeutic justice, judicial monitoring, order maintenance, and 
decarceration). 
 26  See Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts and Pragmatism, 73 MD. L. REV. 1120, 1122 
(2014). 
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and fulfill this mission by offering treatment to low-level offenders instead 
of a conventional sentence.27 The goal is to address the underlying cause of 
criminal activity, namely drug use, and by doing so to reduce recidivism and 
promote healthier communities.28 Second, the judge typically works with an 
interdisciplinary team to devise a treatment plan.29 And third, the judge, as 
leader of the “treatment team,” monitors the defendant’s compliance with 
the treatment regimen.30 Individuals who successfully complete drug 
treatment are rewarded with dismissal or expungement of the original 
charge, while those who fail may serve a traditional jail-based sentence.31 
The drug court model has been linked to David Wexler’s theory of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, which emphasizes “the law’s influence on 
emotional life and psychological well-being.”32 
Drug courts are often described as an alternative to “assembly line” 
justice and an effort to close the “revolving door” that cycles criminal 
defendants in and out of the justice system.33 The movement is “essentially . 
. . judge-led”34 and grew out of frustration that traditional criminal law 
administration had transformed most courtrooms into plea bargain factories 
where cases were disposed of quickly and little thought was given to the root 
causes of crime.35 Greg Berman and John Feinblatt, two architects of the 
drug court model, frame its problem-solving approach as a response to 
 
 27  McLeod, supra note 1, at 1590–91.  
 28  See Denise C. Gottfredson, Stacy S. Najaka & Brook Kearley, Effectiveness of Drug 
Treatment Courts: Evidence from a Randomized Trial, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172 
(2003).  
 29  MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 11, 28, 31.  
 30  See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131–32; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug 
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 843 (2000); 
Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 423 (2009). 
 31  MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 11; JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING 
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 40 (2001); Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, 
at 126; Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1211–12 (1998). 
 32  David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and 
Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 
(Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000).  
 33  See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 130, 135 (discussing judges, defense attorneys and 
prosecutors as working on an “assembly line” and presiding over “McJustice” courts); Michael C. 
Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2004) (claiming that traditional courts create a “revolving door”); see 
also Nolan, supra note 23, at 36 (noting that drug offenders were simply “recycled through the 
criminal justice system”).  
 34  NOLAN, supra note 31, at 42. 
 35  See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 129 (describing traditional courts as “plea bargain 
mills”).  
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“rising caseloads and increasing frustration—both among the public and 
among system players—with the standard approach to case processing in 
state courts.”36 The Conference of Chief Justices, the highest policy-making 
body of judges in the United States, has endorsed the model as a way of 
responding to complex social issues, such as substance abuse, that traditional 
adjudication has failed to address.37 
The crux of the drug court model is the treatment alternative to 
incarceration. Rather than ordering jail time for minor offenses such as drug 
possession, shoplifting, or loitering, drug courts aim to address the social 
problems that drive criminal conduct.38 By offering treatment for drug 
addiction, or by connecting defendants to appropriate public services or 
benefits,39 the model seeks to prevent repeated interaction with the criminal 
justice system.40 In general, the drug court mission is outcome focused, with 
far less emphasis on formal procedure.41 When evaluated, success is 
measured by completion of treatment programs and lower rates of 
recidivism.42 This orientation stands in stark contrast to conventional court 
systems, where substantive outcome measures are rarely imposed, and the 
 
 36  Id. at 128. According to the National Center for State Courts, criminal caseloads rose by 
nearly fifty percent between 1984 and 1998. See BRIAN J. OSTROM, NEAL B. KAUDER & ROBERT 
C. LAFOUNTAIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE 
COURTS, 1999–2000: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 14, 60 
(2001). From 1993 to 2002, criminal caseloads rose by nineteen percent. DAVID B. ROTTMAN, THE 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, TRENDS IN STATE COURTS: RISING CASELOADS AND VANISHING 
TRIALS 300 (2005). Since the early 2000s, caseloads have achieved greater stability, with no major 
rise reported. See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING 
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 20 (2012). 
 37  Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717, 771–72 
(2008).  
 38  Nolan, supra note 23, at 36; Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk 
Managers: A New Conceptualization of the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 93, 130 (2007). 
 39  GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, JUDGES AND 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 4 (2002) (“[M]any [drug court] participants find themselves linked to 
an array of services (job training, health care, education, housing) designed to insure their 
successful transition from addiction to sobriety.”); Jim Dwyer, A Court Keeps People Out of Rikers 
While Remaining Tough, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2BAdtZG (describing the 
Red Hook Community Court, which connects defendants with social services on the spot); see also 
MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 11–12, 14 (describing the array of services often 
provided to problem-solving court participants). 
 40  See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131; Gottfredson, Najaka & Kearley, supra note 
28, at 172 (“Drug treatment courts are designed to increase the likelihood that drug-addicted 
offenders will seek and persist longer in drug treatment, which is expected to help these individuals 
reduce their drug dependence and develop healthier, more productive, and crime-free lifestyles.”); 
Judith S. Kaye, Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 13. 
 41  See Boldt, supra note 26, at 1129 (describing problem-solving courts as “offer[ing] the 
promise of informal, individualized engagement by judges and other court officials in order to find 
‘what works’ instead of settling for the operation of formal, rule-based procedures that to not”).  
 42  Cf. Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131 (describing reduced recidivism as a goal of 
problem-solving courts).  
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focus instead is on rapid case resolution43 and the application of law to facts 
irrespective of the impact of the court’s decision on the defendant’s life and 
future prospects.44 Indeed, traditional courts derive their legitimacy from the 
perception that the judge is impartial and dispassionate with regard to the 
outcome.45 Drug court judges are not neutral in the same way; they name 
particular outcome-based goals and use the authority of the court to motivate 
defendants to remain in treatment. 
Interdisciplinary teams are an important component of drug courts’ 
problem-solving model. Judges collaborate with social workers, treatment 
providers, probation workers, and lawyers to develop and supervise 
treatment plans.46 In place of an adversary process, the various actors in the 
legal system work together to promote the defendant’s compliance with the 
prescribed program. Some commentators have criticized the team approach, 
noting that it can erode the defendant’s due process rights as well as defense 
counsel’s advocacy role.47 However, the interdisciplinary team also offers a 
distinct advantage in providing the court with expertise on specific social 
issues such as addiction and mental illness, and in educating the court on the 
challenges faced by specific population subgroups, such as veterans, 
homeless individuals, or returning citizens.48 This expertise can be 
 
 43  See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 135 (“[F]or a long time, my claim to fame was that 
I arraigned 200 cases in one session. That’s ridiculous. . . . I’d be handed the papers, say the 
sentence is going to be five days, ten days, whatever, never even looking at the defendant.” (quoting 
an administrative judge for New York City’s criminal courts)). 
 44  Judge Ferdinand recalls that, as a traditional criminal trial judge, she said on “many, many 
occasions . . . ‘I am constrained by the law not to grant that motion’ or ‘I am unable to reach some 
conclusion despite the obvious fairness of that result.’” Jo Ann Ferdinand et al., The Judicial 
Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2011, 2013 (2002).  
 45  Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the 
Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1499 (2004).  
 46  See DRUG POLICY ALL., DRUG COURTS ARE NOT THE ANSWER: TOWARD A HEALTH-
CENTERED APPROACH TO DRUG USE 6 (2011); Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131–32; 
Miller, supra note 30, at 423; Michael L. Perlin, “The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside”: Mental 
Health Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL’Y J., no. 1, 2013, at 1, 12. 
 47  See Boldt, supra note 31, at 1255–60 (noting criticisms of defense counsel’s role in drug 
court treatment programs); Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, 
20 FED. SENT’G REP. 127, 129 (2007) (noting concern about lack of due process); Perlin, supra 
note 46, at 18–19 (noting concern about erosion of advocacy role); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team 
Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 56–58 (2000) (same). 
 48  See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1613 (characterizing “therapeutic judges” as “active and 
engaged, invested in acquiring expertise regarding the problems they address”); Anthony C. 
Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
63, 75 (2002) (“[T]he intense focus on drug addiction by professionals in the justice system and 
medical field through drug courts has helped increase the courts’ understanding of the nature of 
addiction.”). 
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invaluable in formulating appropriate and individualized treatment plans that 
take into account the nature of the underlying issue, the behavioral patterns 
that courts may witness as defendants engage with treatment and the need to 
develop constructive responses to relapse.49 
Perhaps most importantly, drug courts rely heavily on an active judge 
to monitor the defendant’s progress.50 In the drug court context, Michael 
Dorf and Charles Sabel describe the “central innovation” of the problem-
solving model as the requirement that each defendant “appear in court 
regularly” accompanied by the treatment provider’s report.51 The judge is the 
leader of the treatment team and interacts directly with defendants to discuss 
progress or setbacks in treatment.52 Praise, applause, token prizes, and 
graduation ceremonies are offered to defendants who exhibit good 
performance.53 For those who fail drug tests, or otherwise refuse to comply 
with treatment goals, judges issue warnings, reprimands, or sanctions that 
may include community service, more frequent hearings, or even short stints 
in jail.54 Direct and immediate accountability to the judge is a hallmark of 
the drug court model55 and is thought to have a positive impact on retention 
in the program.56 
 
 49  See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 39, at 5; Thompson, supra note 48, at 75 (noting 
that drug court judges “have come to expect that an individual will relapse during the process of 
recovery” and have designed a system of incentives and treatment that evidence a “depth of 
understanding of the pull of addiction . . . not evident among judges before the advent of drug 
courts”).  
 50  GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING 
JUSTICE 35 (2005); Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving 
Judges and Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65 
MD. L. REV. 82, 84, 87 n.21 (2000); Casey, supra note 45, at 1462.  
 51  See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 30, at 843.  
 52  DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 46, at 5–6.  
 53  See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 30, at 846–48 (discussing ceremonies, applause, and tokens 
of progress); Gottfredson, Najaka & Kearley, supra note 28, at 172 (discussing judicial praise for 
successful program performance); Nolan, supra note 23, at 29 (describing use of “praise, applause, 
and prizes” for defendants who stay committed to drug treatment). 
 54  See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 30, at 846–48 (discussing sanctions, demotions to an earlier 
program phase, and short period of incarceration); Gottfredson, Najaka & Kearley, supra note 28, 
at 177; Nolan, supra note 23, at 29. Although much scholarly and media attention has been devoted 
to the use of jail time as a sanction in drug courts, the director of the National Association of Drug 
Court Professionals stated on This American Life that “[a]ny drug court that relies primarily on jail, 
or punishment generally, is operating way outside our philosophy and just does not understand 
addiction.” Very Tough Love: Act One at 15:21, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Mar. 25, 2011), 
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/430/very-tough-love. He reported that most drug courts use jail 
very infrequently, and for short timeframes like “12 hours, 24 hours.” Id. at 16:30.  
 55  See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 39, at 5 (“Instead of passing off cases after rendering 
a sentence—to other judges, to probation departments, to community-based treatment programs or, 
in all too many cases, to no one at all—judges at problem-solving courts stay involved with each 
case over the long haul.”).  
 56  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: 
THE KEY COMPONENTS 15 (1997); Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review—
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As a condition of federal funding, problem-solving courts have been 
subject to rigorous evaluation by social scientists.57 The mechanics and 
outcomes of drug courts, in particular, have been studied extensively. While 
the data are not entirely consistent, the efficacy of the drug court model is 
largely supported by empirical data. A number of randomized trials and 
meta-analyses of observational studies have concluded that drug courts 
lower recidivism rates and promote abstention from drug use.58 There is also 
evidence that the model reduces reliance on incarceration as a way to manage 
drug-addicted or mentally ill individuals.59 There is reason, therefore, to 
consider the extension of drug courts’ problem-solving principles to the civil 
courts, where thorny social issues also arise and are ill-suited to resolution 
through traditional case processing. 
 
1999 Update, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST. REV., Winter 1999, at 1, 23 (noting that in one study, drug 
court graduates reported that the one of the most important elements of drug court helping them 
stay drug-free was the close judicial monitoring); Douglas B. Marlowe, David S. Festinger & 
Patricia A. Lee, The Judge Is a Key Component of Drug Court, 4 DRUG CT. REV., no. 2, 2004, at 
1, 5 (finding that high-risk defendants fared better when they had to make regular appearances 
before a judge).  
 57  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-53, ADULT DRUG COURTS: STUDIES 
SHOW COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM, BUT DOJ COULD ENHANCE FUTURE PERFORMANCE 
MEASURE REVISION EFFORTS 2 (2011).  
 58  See, e.g., id. at 19 (finding the re-arrest rate for drug court participants was lower than for 
comparison group members by six to twenty-six percent); Belenko, supra note 56, at 5 (reviewing 
twenty-nine evaluations of thirty different drug courts, and finding that drug courts reduce drug use 
and criminal behavior while offenders are participating in drug court, and also that drug courts 
reduce recidivism for participants after they leave the program); Gottfredson, Najaka & Kearley, 
supra note 28, at 188–89 (reporting a fourteen percent reduction in recidivism for drug court 
participants in Baltimore arising out of a randomized experiment); Deborah Koetzle et al., Treating 
High-Risk Offenders in the Community: The Potential of Drug Courts, 59 INT’L J. OFFENDER 
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450 (2015) (citing many major studies conducted from 
2000 to 2011); David B. Wilson et al., A Systematic Review of Drug Court Effects on Recidivism, 
2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 459, 459 (2006) (describing a meta-analytical review in which 
“[t]he overall findings tentatively suggest that drug offenders participating in a drug court are less 
likely to reoffend than similar offenders sentenced to traditional correctional options”). But see 
Elizabeth Piper Deschenes et al., Drug Court or Probation? An Experimental Evaluation of 
Maricopa County’s Drug Court, 18 JUST. SYS. J., no. 1, 1995, at 55, 55 (randomly assigning 630 
defendants to either drug court or routine probation, and finding no statistically significant 
difference between the control and treatment groups in terms of new arrests, although drug court 
participants had a lower overall rate of drug violations).  
 59  See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1642 n.224, 1650–51 (citing various studies demonstrating 
that problem-solving courts can successfully divert defendants with mental health and substance 
abuse issues to alternative programming). But see Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 273, 285–86 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), 
http://academyforjustice.org/volume3/ (characterizing the “scorecard for drug-treatment court 
success” as “guardedly optimistic,” but pointing out that most drug court studies measure 
recidivism, whereas outcomes on housing and employment status are considerably more mixed). 
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II 
UNRESOLVED SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE CIVIL COURTS—AND THE STRUCTURAL 
FORCES TO BLAME 
Outside of family law matters, the civil courts have been left largely 
untouched by the drug court movement’s pioneering problem-solving 
philosophy.60 Very little experimentation has entered the civil justice realm, 
and traditional methods of case resolution remain the only option for most 
litigants and judges. However, much like the criminal courts, the civil courts 
also confront a number of entrenched social problems that conventional 
adjudication has proven powerless to address. Relying on illustrations from 
the two most commonly adjudicated disputes in the civil arena, rental 
housing and consumer debt, this Part highlights the social issues at stake, and 
examines three structural forces that allow powerful interests to coopt the 
courts as institutional partners in the perpetuation of unjust and socially 
detrimental outcomes. In the same way that overcrowded dockets and the 
inefficacy of traditional process led to the drug court movement in the 
criminal justice system, analogous structural conditions in the civil courts 
invite adaptation of the drug court’s problem-solving model to civil justice 
matters. 
A. Unresolved Social Problems in the Civil Courts 
Together, eviction and debt collection comprise nearly half of all 
litigation in the civil courts.61 While these cases are often construed as 
matters of individual contract, they also invoke, in the aggregate, a number 
of pressing social problems that the courts have not been able to address. 
1. Substandard Housing Conditions 
Renters are the subject of aggressive and relentless eviction actions in 
many areas of the country.62 In Baltimore, for example, the number of 
 
 60  For examples of similarities between drug court and family court, see Barbara A. Babb, 
Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to 
Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469, 507 (1998) (offering a new framework 
for family court reform based on mental health); Boldt & Singer, supra note 50, at 91–95 
(comparing and contrasting unified family courts to drug courts). 
 61  Excluding family courts, forty-three percent of civil cases are debt collection or eviction. 
See PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE: THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS, at iii (2015).  
 62  The number of evictions may even undercount the overall figure of forced moves. See 
Andrew Flowers, How We Undercounted Evictions by Asking the Wrong Questions, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 15, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-we-undercounted-
evictions-by-asking-the-wrong-questions/ (reporting on data from the Milwaukee Area Renters 
Study which demonstrated that “forced moves” outside of the courts occurred twice as often as 
formal evictions). 
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eviction actions exceeds the number of renter-occupied households by a 
significant margin,63 and evictions make up the majority of district court 
litigation.64 In cost-burdened households the impact is greatest, with families 
sometimes subject to three evictions per year.65 In Cleveland, for example, 
more than ten percent of renters are summoned to eviction court each year,66 
and even in New Jersey, where tenant protections are among the strongest in 
the country, one in six renters defended against an eviction in court in the 
2013–2014 fiscal year.67 These figures do not even take into account the 
number of “forced moves” that occur in the shadow of the law.68 
The landlord’s allegations in an eviction suit typically charge the tenant 
with violating the terms of the lease, most often by failing to pay rent.69 And 
while the contractual breach may be easy to prove and even uncontested, 
lurking below the surface is the tenant’s mutually enforceable right to safe 
and sanitary housing conditions. 
The implied warranty of habitability, enacted by ordinance or 
developed through common law in every jurisdiction in the country, makes 
mutually enforceable the landlord’s right to demand rent payment and the 
tenant’s right to seek repairs of defective housing conditions.70 Therefore, 
when courts process evictions, they also—whether explicitly or not—come 
into contact with one of the most intractable social problems facing low-
income communities: the prevalence of substandard housing. A recent 
community listening project in the District of Columbia identified housing 
as the single most pervasive concern among the survey’s respondents.71 
More than a third of individuals who participated in the study felt their 
housing conditions were unsafe, and forty percent experienced problems 
 
 63  See PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 10, at 56 (reporting that, in 2013, there were 124,782 
renter-occupied units and 156,476 evictions filed, for an average of 1.25 evictions per household, 
and identifying similar statistics for 2000 and 2009). 
 64  See id. at 4 (noting that Baltimore’s District Court had 278,809 annual filings in 2014, and 
148,189 were evictions). 
 65  Id. at 5. 
 66  See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 296 & 
n.10 (2016). 
 67  Shaila Dewan, Evictions Soar in Hot Market; Renters Suffer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014), 
https://nyti.ms/2C5gnqC.  
 68  See generally DESMOND, supra note 66 (documenting extreme housing instability among 
renters due to the ever-present threat of eviction).  
 69  For instance, in New York City, eighty-one percent of residential evictions during 2013 
alleged nonpayment of rent. See N.Y.C. CIVIL COURT, STATISTICAL REPORT OF ACTIVITY OF 
LANDLORD & TENANT CLERK’S OFFICE, 2013 TERM 1 (2014).  
 70  E.g., Super, supra note 10, at 394.  
 71  See FAITH MULLEN & ENRIQUE PUMAR, D.C. CONSORTIUM OF LEGAL SERVS. PROVIDERS, 
THE COMMUNITY LISTENING PROJECT 1–2, 8 (2016), https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar/948/.  
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keeping up with rent increases and seeking repairs from their landlords.72 In 
Milwaukee, ethnographic work shows that nearly half of renters lived with a 
long and lasting habitability problem between 2009 and 2011.73 
Regulatory bodies, such as code enforcement agencies, are charged 
with improving the housing stock, but many such agencies have been 
plagued by inefficiencies, underfunding, mismanagement, and even 
corruption.74 As a result, the courts have become a critical forum of last resort 
for administering the implied warranty of habitability. In a well-functioning 
adjudication system, tenants would raise defective housing conditions as a 
defense against eviction, or to lower their rent obligation, and the courts 
would regularly enforce such rights as a matter of substantive law. Instead, 
the courts churn through housing cases at breakneck speed, typically 
authorizing eviction while ignoring the ever-present and interconnected 
problem of substandard housing.75 
2. Consumer Protection 
Debt collection is the other dominant source of litigation in the civil 
courts. In New York City, for example, creditors sued 135,000 individuals 
for defaulting on consumer debt in 2011, accounting for nearly four out of 
ten civil filings.76 In some jurisdictions, the deluge of debt collection 
litigation is even greater. The Texas Office of Court Administration reports 
 
 72  Id. at 2. 
 73  DESMOND, supra note 66, at 76 (noting that almost half of renters experienced housing 
problems like a broken window, a non-functioning appliance, or vermin). 
 74  See Debbie Cenziper & Sarah Cohen, The Profit in Decay: Landlords Who Empty Buildings 
of Tenants Reap Extra Benefit Under Law, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/03/08/ST2008030803137.html 
(finding city officials in Washington, D.C. improperly granted housing code exemptions to 
landlords converting rental units to condominiums); Benjamin Mueller, New York City Buildings 
Inspectors Charged in Bribe Schemes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/nyregion/new-york-city-buildings-inspectors-charged-
with-bribery.html (reporting on charges that more than a dozen New York City buildings inspectors 
accepted bribes to clear complaints, expedite inspections, and improperly remove tenants); David 
Zahniser, Los Angeles Building Inspector Gets Prison in Felony Bribery Case, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 
25, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/25/local/la-me-building-inspector-corruption-
20140325 (reporting on sentencing of former building inspector in Los Angeles who accepted 
bribes for more than a dozen properties he was responsible for).  
 75  See PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 10, at 14, 36 (reporting that seventy-eight percent of 
renters experienced serious habitability issues, but only eight percent successfully raised their 
defective housing conditions in court); Kathyrn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 56, 103–04, 107–09 (2018); Super, supra note 10, at 437–38 (referring to 
Cleveland and Detroit, two cities in which landlords won eviction judgments in nearly all cases 
despite evidence that housing conditions were substantially worsening).  
 76  SUSAN SHIN & CLAUDIA WILNER, NEW ECON. PROJECT, THE DEBT COLLECTION RACKET 
IN NEW YORK: HOW THE INDUSTRY VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND PERPETUATES ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY 6 (Sarah Ludwig & Josh Zinner eds., 2013) (reporting that, in New York City in 2011, 
of the 370,924 civil court filings in New York City Civil Court, 134,980 were debt collections). 
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that “suits on debt” account for 43.8% of cases in county-level courts 
statewide.77 The rate of debt collection litigation is subject to rapid growth 
in times of economic volatility. In three San Francisco Bay Area counties, 
consumer debt cases increased by eighty percent from 2007 to 2009.78 
High levels of debt drive poverty and income inequality, and collection 
litigation can deepen the effects of both.79 A creditor who obtains a court 
judgment for unpaid debt may garnish wages and attach liens on real 
property, making it more difficult for cash-strapped families to pay bills or 
sell existing assets to support their needs.80 In addition, collection suits may 
impede recovery from a period of financial instability, as big data companies 
often bundle and sell information on recent judgments to prospective 
landlords and employers, exposing otherwise private economic struggles and 
potentially complicating efforts to find new housing or a job.81 The Federal 
Reserve estimates that, in April 2016, consumer debt reached 3.6 trillion 
dollars, up nearly fifty percent from 2.41 trillion in January 2011.82 
Protection against consumer fraud is vitally important to fair debt 
collection. Empirical research suggests that fraudulent practices fuel the 
collection of debt nationwide.83 In one study, debt buyers prevailed in ninety-
 
 77  Spector, supra note 12, at 273. 
 78  https://consumersunion.org/pdf/Past_Due_Report_2011.pdf.  
 79  See ADP RESEARCH INST., GARNISHMENT: THE UNTOLD STORY 6 (2014) (describing the 
financial and psychological stresses associated with garnishment); Aimee Constantineau, 
Comment, Fair for Whom? Why Debt-Collection Lawsuits in St. Louis Violate the Procedural Due 
Process Rights of Low-Income Communities, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 486–87 (2016) (describing 
how garnishment compounds inequality); Paul Kiel, Old Debts, Fresh Pain: Weak Laws Offer 
Debtors Little Protection, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/old-
debts-fresh-pain-weak-laws-offer-debtors-little-protection (describing, inter alia, the expense of 
litigation). 
 80  FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT 
COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 5–6 (2010).  
 81  MAUREEN MAHONEY, CONSUMERS UNION, ERRORS AND GOTCHAS: HOW CREDIT REPORT 
ERRORS AND UNRELIABLE CREDIT SCORES HURT CONSUMERS 11, 19 (2014) (describing the 
impact of such information on the ability to procure loans and employment); James A. Francis, The 
FCRA: A Double-Edged Sword for Consumer Data Sellers, GPSOLO, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 36, 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012privacyandcon
fidentiality/fcra_double_edged_sword_consumer_data_sellers.html (describing how credit data 
threatens consumer privacy).  
 82  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STATISTICAL RELEASE: CONSUMER 
CREDIT—APRIL 2016 (2016) (putting total outstanding seasonally adjusted consumer debt in April 
2016 at 3.601 trillion); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STATISTICAL RELEASE: 
CONSUMER CREDIT—JANUARY 2011 (2011) (putting total outstanding seasonally adjusted 
consumer debt in January 2011 at 2.412 trillion). 
 83  See generally STIFLER & PARRISH, supra note 11 (describing how debt collection and 
misinformation expose American households to harassment and other illegal conduct); Stifler, 
supra note 20, at 107 (describing how deceptive practices like inadequately proven or time-barred 
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four percent of consumer debt cases, despite widespread evidence that many 
collections suits were premised on procedural and substantive law 
violations.84 Another study found that eighty percent of debt cases examined 
involved consumer protection violations that were never raised, ultimately 
resulting in judgments for creditors.85 In yet a third study, up to seventy-eight 
percent of collections complaints did not meet pleading and proof standards, 
and yet almost half of creditors still won their cases.86 Debt collectors also 
obtain quick and easy judgments against consumers even where the right to 
recover on the unpaid account may have been encumbered by the staleness 
of the debt or the discharge of the debt through bankruptcy.87 Following a 
series of roundtable discussions with advocates, judges, and collections 
industry personnel, the Federal Trade Commission concluded that, on the 
measure of consumer protection, the court process was “broken.”88 
B. Structural Failings in Civil Adjudication 
This Section argues that three structural conditions may explain why 
the civil courts produce poor social outcomes on critical and recurring issues 
such as substandard housing and consumer protection. Specifically, I 
identify low rates of attorney representation, high-volume dockets, and the 
capture of small claims tribunals by corporate interests as forces that weaken 
the capacity of traditional courts to solve social problems for particular 
groups of litigants. The account of civil adjudication offered in this Section 
 
debt go unchallenged). 
 84  THE LEGAL AID SOC’Y ET AL., DEBT DECEPTION: HOW DEBT BUYERS ABUSE THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM TO PREY ON LOWER-INCOME NEW YORKERS 1–2 (2010) (asserting that debt buyers 
prevailed in 94.3% of lawsuits, and of these, 35% of cases were clearly meritless, and 71% of 
people sued were either not served or served improperly). 
 85  Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the 
System Failed?, 67 DENV. L. REV. 357, 384 (1990).  
 86  See Spector, supra note 12, at 293–96 (finding that, despite 78% of the cases studied having 
only one affidavit, filed by an employee of the plaintiff, plaintiffs still obtained default or agreed 
judgments in 39.46% and 4.93% of cases, respectively).  
 87  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at ii (noting the Commission’s concerns about the 
high rate of default judgments and the practice of brining actions on time-barred debts); see also 
RICK JURGENS & ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE DEBT MACHINE: HOW 
THE COLLECTION INDUSTRY HOUNDS CONSUMERS AND OVERWHELMS COURTS 18 (2010) 
(discussing how debtors may face years of badgering from creditors for claims discharged in 
bankruptcy); RACHEL TERP, E. BAY CMTY. LAW CTR., & LAUREN BROWNE, CONSUMERS UNION, 
PAST DUE: WHY DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES AND THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY NEED 
REFORM NOW 4–5 (2011). 
 88  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at i–ii, 17; see also THE LEGAL AID SOC’Y ET AL., 
supra note 84, at 1 (describing a deluge of frivolous lawsuits filed by debt buyers); Peter A. 
Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 233 (2014) (referring to a “broken debt collection system”); Stifler, supra 
note 20, at 93 (listing common debt-collecting abuses like insufficient evidence, time-barred 
collection, and robo-signing). 
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suggests structural conditions in the civil courts that parallel those in the 
criminal courts and may justify consideration of problem-solving methods. 
1. Hardly Any Lawyers 
According to the National Center for State Courts, seventy-six percent 
of cases in the civil courts now involve an unrepresented party.89 In 1992, 
the last time comprehensive national data were collected, the pro se rate was 
just twenty-four percent.90 This sea change over the past twenty-five years 
has resulted in a state civil justice system defined by the effects of systemic 
lack of counsel. 
In rental housing and consumer debt cases, low rates of attorney 
representation are particularly problematic for two reasons. First, 
representation rates for tenants and consumers are among the lowest of all 
groups in the civil justice system. In New York, Maryland, and the District 
of Columbia, among many other jurisdictions, the representation rate for 
tenants hovers at around ten percent or less.91 Consumers fare no better, with 
the pro se rate sometimes reported to be as high as ninety-nine percent.92 
Second, lopsided representation in housing and consumer matters is 
standard, meaning that the more powerful party to the litigation is highly 
likely to have an attorney, while the less powerful party almost never does. 
In many courts, landlord representation rates are around ninety percent.93 
Similar statistics are often cited for debt buyers and other creditors.94 In some 
jurisdictions, corporations are required to appear in court through attorneys, 
ensuring that virtually all plaintiffs in consumer debt cases will be 
 
 89  HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 61, at iii–iv (basing this figure on a survey of almost 
one million cases in 152 general jurisdiction courts). 
 90  Id. at 28. 
 91  Steinberg, supra, note 13. at 750.  
 92  THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE 
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1 (2010); see also Spector, supra note 12, at 297 
(finding over ninety percent of defendants in consumer debt cases in Texas were either pro se or 
made no appearance).  
 93  D.C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE FOR ALL? AN EXAMINATION OF THE CIVIL 
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S LOW-INCOME COMMUNITY 74 (2008) (revealing 
ninety percent of landlords had counsel in a survey of Washington, D.C.); WILLIAM E. MORRIS 
INST. FOR JUSTICE, INJUSTICE IN NO TIME: THE EXPERIENCE OF TENANTS IN MARICOPA COUNTY 
JUSTICE COURTS 8 (2005) (finding eighty-seven percent of cases in study were brought by 
represented landlords); Rashida Abuwala & Donald J. Farole, The Perceptions of Self-Represented 
Tenants in a Community-Based Housing Court, 44 CT. REV., no. 1/2, 2007, at 56 (reporting that 
ninety-eight percent of landlords were represented, according to one report of New York City). 
 94  See STAUFFER, supra note 17, at 4 (describing the plaintiffs in debt collection cases as “large 
corporations represented by top-tier collections attorneys,” while “hardly any of the defendants in 
debt buyer lawsuits have legal representation”). 
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represented.95 
High rates of lopsided representation have had an enormous impact on 
case adjudication in the civil courts. The side without counsel is likely to 
have difficulty identifying legally cognizable claims and parsing through the 
procedural thicket of case presentation.96 Without attorney guidance, for 
instance, tenants may be unaware of their rights to raise substandard housing 
as a defense to an eviction.97 Similarly, consumers may not be familiar with 
the procedural and evidentiary rules required to stave off the collection of 
stale debt.98 As a result, it is not uncommon for landlords or creditors to 
control entirely the facts and evidence considered by the judge, and to do so 
across an entire docket. This type of information asymmetry compromises 
accurate judicial decision-making and leads to the gross under-enforcement 
of rights for particular classes of litigants. 
2. High-Volume Dockets 
High-volume dockets present a second structural problem in the civil 
courts. With millions of rental housing and consumer cases to contend with, 
courts struggle to offer litigants a genuine opportunity to adjudicate their 
claims. 
To winnow caseloads to a manageable figure, the civil justice system 
tolerates, and perhaps even promotes, a high rate of default.99 In consumer 
matters, for example, many jurisdictions have reported default rates as high 
as sixty to ninety-five percent.100 Unique to the civil courts, default 
 
 95  For example, corporations must be represented by counsel in both Arkansas and Arizona. 
See ARK. CODE § 16-22-211(a)–(d) (2018); see also Boydston v. Strole Dev. Co., 969 P.2d 653 
(Ariz. 1998).  
 96  See Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Lawyers, Power, and Strategic 
Expertise, 93 DENV. L. REV. 469, 489–504 (2016) (surveying the effect of expertise in 
representation); Steinberg, supra note 13, at 755–56, 794–95 (describing the difficulties faced by 
those litigants who represent themselves at trial and arguing for reform). 
 97  See PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 10, at 19. 
 98  See Spector, supra note 12, at 280–82. 
 99  See Jonathan I. Rose & Martin A. Scott, “Street Talk” Summonses in Detroit’s Landlord-
Tenant Court: A Small Step Forward for Urban Tenants, 52 U. Detroit J. URB. L. 967, 988 & n.88 
(1975) (quoting a judge as saying that housing court is so packed “the clerk calls defaults as soon 
as possible to ease the congestion . . . [thereby working] hardship on the tenants”) (alterations in 
original); Super, supra note 10, at 434–35 (“Courts depend on default judgments to control their 
dockets and design procedures to obtain them whenever possible, typically requiring no motion or 
affidavit . . . before entering a default judgment.”). 
 100  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at 7; see also SHIN & WILNER, supra note 76, at 6 
(listing the default rate for Syracuse City Court as sixty-two percent). Even in Dallas County, Texas, 
which boasts among the lowest reported default rates in debt collection suits, the figure still rose to 
nearly forty percent. Spector, supra note 12, at 263. Default rates are also high in housing matters. 
See Erik Larson, Case Characteristics and Defendant Tenant Default in a Housing Court, 3 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 121, 130 (2006) (studying a housing court in Hennepin County, 
Minnesota with a default rate of 40.4%). 
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judgments effectively preclude defendants from participating in the litigation 
brought against them, instead awarding all requested relief to the plaintiff, 
often without requiring testimony or proof on the asserted claims. Research 
conducted by Human Rights Watch describes the casual way in which courts 
process default judgments in collections matters, typically without requiring 
the debt collector to testify, appear in court, or otherwise establish a valid 
claim: “Some judges routinely enter hundreds of default judgments for debt 
buyers in the space of just a few hours. One judge [said] that he does this at 
home while relaxing on a Sunday afternoon.”101 
To further manage high-volume dockets, the civil courts encourage a 
substantial portion of non-defaulting cases to be resolved through 
unmonitored settlement negotiations.102 Russell Engler has described the 
pressure tenants face to enter quick agreements in the courthouse hallways 
without legal advice or judicial oversight.103 In the District of Columbia, 
judges in housing court routinely abort hearings to instruct pro se tenants to 
barter directly with their represented adversaries outside the courtroom.104 
While settlement is promoted across the civil spectrum, and often can 
be in the parties’ best interests,105 it reliably produces pernicious results for 
unrepresented litigants—particularly those who must negotiate with an 
attorney.106 In a study I conducted in a Silicon Valley housing court in 
2009,107 tenants who settled their eviction lawsuits fared even worse as a 
 
 101  STAUFFER, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
 102  The inherently unbalanced nature of many settlement negotiations in the civil setting 
parallels the way in which criminal defendants are so often cajoled into striking unfair plea deals 
with prosecutors. 
 103  See Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ 
Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 104, 109 (1997); see also 
Sabbeth, supra note 75, at 79–80 (similarly describing rushed, unfavorable hallway settlements). 
For discussion of a similar dynamic in consumer cases, see STAUFFER, supra note 17, at 3–4 
(discussing the common judicial practice in consumer debt matters to “push defendants into 
unsupervised ‘discussions’ with debt buyer attorneys” in the hallways of the courthouse “in hopes 
that the parties will settle and obviate the need for a trial”). 
 104  This is drawn from my personal observations in D.C.’s landlord-tenant court. 
 105  See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation 
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340, 1350–51 (1994) (describing the growing sentiment 
among the judiciary that settlement is part of the judicial role, and listing the many perceived 
benefits of settlement).  
 106  See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data 
Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 47–48 (2010); Erica L. 
Fox, Note, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 85, 102–03 (1996). Similar conditions plague negotiated agreements in the 
consumer setting. Holland, supra note 88, at 213–14, 224–25.  
 107  See Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of 
Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453 (2011).  
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group than those who defaulted. How, one might ask, is this even possible? 
In the study, on average, those who defaulted lost their homes but usually 
avoided liability for unpaid rent, as most landlords chose not to pursue a 
separate damages award after winning possession of the unit.108 By contrast, 
the settling tenants lost their homes and agreed to pay at least a portion of 
back rent—meaning they “negotiated” for the worst possible outcome.109 
This illustration highlights how unmonitored settlements often promote the 
interests of landlords to the exclusion of tenants’ rights.110 
Finally, even the cases that outlive both default judgment and 
unmonitored settlement negotiations face overburdened courts unable to 
offer a meaningful adjudicatory process.111 Trials are typically handled by 
judges, not juries, and a number of commentators have pointed to the 
condensed interval in which testimony and evidence is gathered and 
weighed. Hearings lasting only a few minutes are not uncommon,112 and 
judges may preside over as many as one hundred cases in a single day.113 An 
Indiana appellate decision recently chided an eviction court for having a 
court reporter—rather than a judge—preside over a hearing, and for 
presenting the tenant “with a pre-signed order requiring her to vacate the 
 
 108  See id. at 487, 491, 493.  
 109  See id.  
 110  See 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 958 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (vacating a 
stipulation reached by a landlord and a tenant in New York City partially on the grounds that tenant 
was unrepresented and case provided a “textbook example of a one-sided stipulation unadvisedly 
signed by a pro se litigant who lacked knowledge of a defense which would have substantially 
defeated petitioner’s claims”); see also PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 10, at 28–29 (relating the 
difficulty tenants experienced when trying to negotiate); Engler, supra note 103, at 113 (discussing 
how tenants may unwittingly waive rights during settlements). 
 111 In consumer matters, trials are arguably even scarcer than in housing cases. Judith L. Fox, 
Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 355, 370, 379 (2012) (reporting that in the author’s study of 640 
consumer cases, not a single matter involved a trial); Holland, supra note 88, at 186–87.  
 112  See 144 Woodruff Corp., 585 N.Y.S.2d at 960 (reporting that housing cases are often 
“disposed of at an average rate of five to fourteen minutes per case”); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR 
BETTER HOUS., supra note 16, at 4 (reporting on the results of an eleven-week study of 763 eviction 
cases in Chicago’s eviction courts, which “revealed problematic trends in a number of areas” 
including “hearings [that] last an average of 1 minute and 44 seconds, a decrease of nearly 50% 
from the 3 minutes observed in 1996”); WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 
9 (discussing a 2004 study of evictions cases in Maricopa County, Arizona, in which a “call for 
evictions can have at least 30 to 60 cases for disposition in 60 minutes or less” and noting that, “[i]n 
some courts, the evictions are set one each minute”). 
 113  See Fox, supra note 106, at 91 (noting that Boston Housing Court judges preside over 250 
to 300 cases per day); Robert Rubinson, There Is No Such Thing as Litigation: Access to Justice 
and the Realities of Adjudication, 18 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 185, 200 (2015) (noting that 
Baltimore’s rent court, which has one judge assigned per day, hears 1050 cases per day); Jessica 
K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 
2016 BYU L. REV. 899, 969 (2016) (noting that a judge may interact with over 100 pro se litigants 
per day).  
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premises” and no opportunity to defend against the ejectment.114 
This system of defaults, settlements, and abbreviated hearings 
exacerbates the imbalance in party power created by lopsided representation 
and creates a procedural structure that—almost by design—privileges the 
rights of more powerful actors. 
3. Capture of Small Claims Courts 
The capture of small claims courts by corporate interests presents a third 
structural force that undermines the effectiveness of existing adjudication 
models in resolving entrenched social problems. In its heyday, the small 
claims movement was hailed as a potential fix for the cost and complexity of 
traditional proceedings.115 With relaxed rules of evidence and procedure, the 
idea was that ordinary laymen could share their stories in narrative fashion, 
interact directly with judges, and generally participate more actively in their 
cases.116 While most proponents of the model focused on the prospect of 
efficient and accurate dispute resolution in individual cases, had the small 
claims system fulfilled its promise, a positive systemic effect on social issues 
certainly would have been felt.  
Instead, the small claims system is gripped by the same power dynamics 
that control the traditional courts, and has largely replicated the same results. 
As one prominent example, small claims tribunals have become the preferred 
venue for corporate creditors prosecuting unpaid debt claims.117 A 2006 
investigation by the Boston Globe revealed that, in Boston, 40,000 debt 
collection suits accounted for eighty-five percent of all cases in the state’s 
busiest small claims court.118 The National Center for State Courts reports 
that three-quarters of plaintiffs in small claims cases are represented by an 
attorney, raising “troubling concerns,” that the system, which was originally 
 
 114  Reynolds v. Capps, 968 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Similar processes are 
common in debt collection cases. See Stifler, supra note 20, at 114–15. 
 115  See Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review 
of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 219, 221–22 (1975). 
 116  See id.; see also JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note 87, at 12–13.  
 117  HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 61, at v, 33; see also JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note 
87, at 12 (“To observe the reach and power of the modern debt machine, one need only pay a visit 
to a local small claims court. Every day hundreds of these low-level state courts mass produce 
judgments against debtors. . . . The debt machine has transformed the character of many small 
claims courts.”). 
 118 See Beth Healy, Dignity Faces a Steamroller: Small-Claims Proceedings Ignore Rights, Tilt 
to Collectors, BOS. GLOBE (July 31, 2006), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2006/07/31/dignity-faces-
steamroller/SoK0TBVHzOzjLEpNqNrVYN/story.html.  
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developed as a forum in which primarily self-represented litigants could use 
a simplified process to resolve civil cases quickly and fairly, now “provide[s] 
a much less evenly balanced playing field than was originally intended.”119  
Judges have allowed corporate parties to exploit the informal regime of 
small claims courts to their advantage. Creditors, for example, often rely on 
flimsy hearsay evidence and bad faith procedural wrangling to pursue 
lawsuits of dubious merit.120 One common practice is “robo-signing,” a tactic 
in which employees of debt collectors “sign affidavits attesting that they 
have personally reviewed and verified debtors’ records, when in fact they 
have only looked at basic account information on a computer screen.”121 
Furthermore, the debt buyers often “have no proof that the debt even existed, 
let alone that the person they are suing was responsible for it.”122 Mary 
Spector explains that consumer debt is often bundled and sold several times; 
at the time of sale, the debt buyer rarely receives more than a computer record 
summarizing the names of the consumers and the total amount each owes.123 
Despite this exchange of limited information, in Professor Spector’s study of 
Texas debt collection practices, more than seventy-eight percent of all cases 
involved affidavits in which the debt buyer claimed to have personal 
knowledge as to the creation of the debt and the accuracy of the amount 
owed.124 
Robo-signing is compounded by “sewer service,” a tactic in which the 
debt collector intentionally fails to serve notice of the collection suit and then 
files a false affidavit of service claiming the defendant has been properly 
notified of the pending action.125 In New York state, the Attorney General’s 
office sued multiple debt collectors after an investigation of 100,000 cases 
revealed acts of fraudulent service.126 In some instances, process servers 
 
 119  HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 61, at 33. 
 120  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at ii (discussing the many practices in consumer 
debt litigation and arbitration that raise consumer protection concerns).  
 121  TERP & BROWNE, supra note 87, at 4.  
 122  Id. 
 123  Spector, supra note 12, at 266–67. 
 124  Id. at 293–94 (reporting on the results of a study involving 400 cases). Spector further 
reports that in 97.22% of cases where affidavits were filed, the affidavit was the only evidence of 
the validity of the account. Id. at 294. See also Stifler, supra note 20, at 105 (discussing robo-
signing as a rampant practice). 
 125  Stifler, supra note 20, at 107 (defining sewer service as “the practice of intentionally filing 
false affidavits of service of process in court”). Like in all civil actions, creditors are required to 
provide debtors with proper notice of a lawsuit filed against them prior to obtaining a judgment. 
E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at 8.  
 126  See Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., The N.Y. State Attorney General Andrew M. 
Cuomo Announces Guilty Plea of Process Server Company Owner Who Denied Thousands of New 
Yorkers Their Day in Court (Jan. 15, 2010), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/new-york-state-
attorney-general-andrew-m-cuomo-announces-guilty-plea-process-server. For a similar action 
filed by private litigants, see Benjamin Mueller, Victims of Debt Collection Scheme in New York 
Win $59 Million in Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2mB3Pg8.  
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claimed to have been at more than one residence at the exact same time; in 
others, claimed attempts to serve court papers would have required the 
process server to drive more than 10,000 miles in a single day.127 Rampant 
reports of sewer service exist in other areas of the country as well.128 In one 
California case, a debt collector claimed to have served a defendant 
personally in her home when in fact she was hospitalized.129 In a second 
California case, the wife of a debtor was reportedly served at the couple’s 
Santa Clara home, even though she had died two years earlier.130 One study 
of process service in New York’s King and Queens Counties found that 
personal service was achieved in only six percent of civil debt collection 
cases.131 
In theory, judges in small claims courts are liberated from the traditional 
adversarial paradigm and authorized to interrogate parties as to the veracity 
of their claims.132 However, these affirmative powers are discretionary and 
not required,133 and in practice, many judges do not seize on the opportunity 
to scrutinize the more powerful party’s assertions.134 Robo-signing and sewer 
 
 127  See Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs., 780 F.3d 70, 76–77 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing a 
district court’s findings that there was substantial support for a finding of sewer service based on 
these factors); Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., supra note 126. 
 128  See U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Debt Collection: Protecting Consumers Roundtable 25–26, 
30–33, 58 (Dec. 4, 2009) (discussing incidents and suspicions of sewer service in Connecticut and 
Florida). 
 129 Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Bay Area Residents Sue Process Servers for Failing to 
Deliver Lawsuits, SAN DIEGO UNION–TRIB. (May 24, 2012), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/g00/sdut-bay-area-residents-sue-process-servers-for-
failing-2012may24-htmlstory.html.  
 130  Id. 
 131  MFY LEGAL SERVS., INC., JUSTICE DISSERVED: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE 
EXCEPTIONALLY LOW APPEARANCE RATE BY DEFENDANTS IN LAWSUITS FILED IN THE CIVIL 
COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 6 (2008). Reviewing its own case data, MFY reports that of 
the 350 individuals assisted with debt collection matters over a twelve-month period, “[i]n nearly 
every case” the client first learned of the debt action brought against them “when their bank account 
was restrained as a result of a default judgment . . . .” Id. at 11.  
 132  See Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the 
Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2016–18 (1999) 
(discussing state small claims court rules allowing judges to relax procedural rules and assist 
unrepresented parties). 
 133  For one example, see the Massachusetts small claims rules, which authorize judges to 
“conduct the trial in such order and form and with such methods of proof as it deems best suited to 
discover the facts and do justice in the case.” MASS. SMALL CLAIMS R. 7(g) (West 2018). See also 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.520 (West 2017) (providing that small claims judges “may consult 
witnesses informally and otherwise investigate the controversy”) (emphasis added); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 55.090 (West 2016) (allowing that the court “may informally consult witnesses or 
otherwise investigate the controversy”) (emphasis added).  
 134  See Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court, 
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service are not regularly challenged by small claims judges.135 And in rental 
housing cases, which are also commonly litigated in small claims tribunals, 
judges do not take action to surface and address the tenant’s right to quality 
housing, even though it is an integral component of many eviction actions, 
and could potentially lower the amount of the disputed contract rent.136 
Judicial training and habit may explain this sort of capture. The 
adversary system acculturates judges to allow parties to control the facts and 
issues in a case. When a debt collector or landlord, typically a repeat player 
accompanied by a lawyer, puts forward a lawsuit, many judges may simply 
hesitate to interfere on behalf of the floundering opponent.137 
Some commentators also note that plain old-fashioned bias, or at least 
preferentialism, may be at play. Judges may simply identify more closely 
with the powerful actor’s predicament, or side with the party most likely to 
benefit a re-election campaign—or, in a rental housing matter, they may even 
implicitly reject the notion that substandard housing should excuse rent 
payments.138 
In short, these three structural forces—systemic lack of representation, 
overcrowded dockets, and corporate capture of small claims tribunals—
place the courts in a position of aggravating, rather than solving, particular 
social issues. Through multiple mechanisms, the adjudicatory process 
virtually guarantees that landlords and creditors can obtain quick and easy 
judgments that further rent and debt collection, while leaving social 
problems (and reciprocal rights) such as protection against substandard 
housing and consumer fraud unaddressed. 
 
10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 339, 353 (1976) (noting that judges in small claims courts do not often 
actively develop facts, despite authorization to do so); Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 115, at 
251–53 (detailing judges’ confusion concerning their role in small claims court and explaining that 
they did not actively question litigants due to their belief that they must remain and appear neutral).  
 135  This is evident by the high rate at which judges enter default judgments despite the fact that 
research reveals a high percentage of cases involving robo-signing or sewer service that could have 
been detected upon judicial examination. See STAUFFER, supra note 17, at 3–4.  
 136  See Michele Cotton, A Case Study on Access to Justice and How to Improve It, 16 J.L. 
SOC’Y 61, 72–74 (2014). 
 137  See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor 
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 579 (1992) (exploring “the paradigm 
of civil disputes, where the judge expects each party to set forth pertinent claims, defenses, 
counterclaims, and evidence”).  
 138  See WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 10 (observing a friendliness 
between judges and landlord attorneys, such that vacation plans were discussed in open court); 
Bezdek, supra note 137, at 571–75 (positing that judges’ “world view” and “professional station” 
may cause them to discount tenant hardship); Sabbeth, supra note 75, at 78–79 (noting that judicial 
bias may favor landlords because judges are more likely to be property owners and discussing how 
the law and culture of housing courts has been influenced over time by disproportionate attorney 
representation of landlords); Super, supra note 10, at 389, 415–16 (discussing judges’ “symbiotic[,] 
cooperative relationships with landlords and their lawyers,” and noting that “[e]lected judges may 
have come to expect the support of the landlords’ bar,” making them vulnerable to capture). 
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III 
A FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 
This Part develops a theory for adapting the drug court model to the 
civil arena. In criminal courts, the heart of the problem-solving model is the 
availability of an alternative remedy: treatment over prison. In civil courts, 
the remedy itself is not necessarily deficient; the law affords important 
protections against substandard housing and unfair debt collection. Instead, 
it is access to the remedy that is compromised. This Part will demonstrate 
how core drug court principles—an intent to solve a social problem, 
interdisciplinary collaboration, and a strong judicial role—can be harnessed 
to address the unique process failures in the civil justice system. Specifically, 
the drug court framework can be exploited in the civil private law setting to 
achieve three process-oriented goals: (1) motivate judges to protect 
vulnerable court users, (2) attack information asymmetry, and (3) monitor 
liable parties to induce performance. 
Relying on extensive field work I conducted in an experimental 
Housing Conditions Court (HCC) in the District of Columbia, this Part 
highlights the relevance and suitability of the problem-solving philosophy to 
attack distinct civil justice problems. Elsewhere, I have evaluated the HCC’s 
inquisitorial features and their correlation to substantive justice in the 
court.139 Here, based on court observations in nearly 300 cases and a 
longitudinal review of 73 matters, I catalogue the HCC’s problem-solving 
characteristics and evaluate the role each might play in mitigating process 
distortions in the civil courts. Despite significant differences with the drug 
court model, a set of the HCC’s adjudicatory features may be stitched 
together to shape an emergent problem-solving model in the private law 
sphere. 
A. Motivating Judges to Protect Vulnerable Court Users 
Drug courts advance their therapeutic goal by naming the purpose of 
the court as solving the social problem of addiction. This naming function 
allows judges to apply an alternative remedy to criminal conduct: 
compulsory treatment. 
An important difference in civil courts is that the existing remedy may 
be adequate and not in need of reform. Housing codes, for instance, enshrine 
substantial protections against unsafe dwellings, and subject property owners 
 
 139  See Steinberg, supra note 17 (finding that the HCC’s “inquisitorial” procedures can lead to 
accurate outcomes for tenants and court success).  
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to fines, damages, and rent abatements for violations ranging from broken 
windows to rodent infestations.140 A robust collection of consumer 
protection laws exist as well and require debt collectors to adhere to rigid 
standards when seeking repayment in court.141 
However, the naming function that is so critical to drug courts can be 
engineered in the civil setting to achieve a different goal: motivating judges 
to protect vulnerable court users. 
1. The Existing Judicial Paradigm 
Civil courts tend to espouse neutral, proceduralist missions that 
emphasize impartial decision making. For instance, a civil court mission 
might announce the court’s intention to “protect rights and liberties, uphold 
and interpret the law, and resolve disputes peacefully, fairly and 
effectively.”142 While such a pronouncement is hardly controversial, it tends 
to reinforce the primacy of a neutral judge who is agnostic as to outcomes. 
In tribunals where both parties are adequately represented, a passive judge 
might indeed be the ideal. But on the pro se dockets that now dominate the 
civil courts, a judge who is not particularly attuned to the rights of vulnerable 
parties may inadvertently allow powerful private actors to control the means 
and objectives of the forum. 
In rental housing and consumer courts, for instance, judges tend to 
adopt rent and debt collection as their assigned purpose, and then conform 
their conduct to meet the perceived or actual expectations of their role.143 In 
a fascinating case study, Michele Cotton presents judge-to-party dialogue 
capturing how, even in a rental housing matter presenting egregious housing 
code violations, the judge is intently focused on the amount of rent owed to 
 
 140  See, e.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, §§ 4, 8 (2018). 
 141  Creditors are barred from many forms of illegal debt collection in court. These include 
prohibitions on the collection of debt that is time-barred (“zombie” debt), is of unknown origin (due 
to bundling and re-sale of debt to third party debt buyers), violates state usury laws, violates service 
of process laws, or is not owed (“phantom” debt). See STIFLER & PARRISH, supra note 11, at 8–17 
(discussing common practices in debt collection litigation and federal and state efforts to regulate 
them). Debtors may also raise protections through the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which 
governs the manner in which a creditor can pursue debt collection, but does not provide any 
defenses to collection actions. Id. at 2; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (2012) (establishing a private 
right of action against debt collectors who violate the FDCPA, but not providing for defenses in 
individual collection lawsuits).  
 142  JOINT COMM. ON JUDICIAL ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
COURTS: 2013–2017, at 13 (2013), https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/matters-
docs/Open-to-All-Trusted-by-All-Justice-for-All-Strategic-Plan-of-the-District-of-Columbia-
Courts-2013-2017_internet.pdf.  
 143  For a discussion of this phenomenon in the debt context, see Healy, supra note 118. See also 
Holland, supra note 88, at 183, 185–86 (contending that his empirical data on 4400 consumer cases 
confirms the “widespread belief that, in our broken system, small claims courts have become an 
extension of the debt collection industry”). 
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the landlord—to the exclusion of the tenant’s equally significant housing 
quality claims.144 This judicial orientation is likely the product of the judge’s 
reflexive, learned behavior over time in a courtroom where only landlords 
wield the expertise and professional assistance to control the issues, facts, 
and evidence in each case. In other words, a “neutral” judicial posture that 
permits parties to direct case presentation will, in a pro se court, enable the 
represented group to undermine the legitimacy of opposing claims, and 
ultimately, to define the goals of adjudication for the tribunal at large. 
2. “Naming” and Judicial Conduct 
The drug court principle of “naming” can be imported into the civil 
justice system to encourage a shift in judicial behavior and attitudes. For 
instance, a civil problem-solving court might name its purpose as promoting 
housing quality, or combatting unlawful debt collection, or preserving 
affordable housing. By redefining the objective of adjudication, the civil 
problem-solving court would not open the gateway to a new remedy, as 
occurs in drug courts; it would instead aim to influence the judges’ behavior, 
and in turn, their state of mind. The idea is that, if judges were to view the 
purpose of the tribunal as, say, improving substandard housing, they would 
approach their work with an eye toward affording tenants the benefit of 
existing substantive and procedural protections—thereby serving as a shield 
against the dominance of powerful private actors. 
The drug court experiment has made plain the connection between 
renaming the purpose of the court and consequent judicial behavior in those 
forums. In furtherance of the treatment goal, drug court judges abandon their 
detached and formal demeanor and work actively with defendants to 
overcome addiction.145 James L. Nolan, Jr., a sociologist who conducted an 
ethnographic study of two-dozen drug courts, describes judges who shed 
their robe and gavel, hug graduates upon completion of the program, and 
generally work to convey a message of “care, concern, and interest” so that 
defendants are motivated to stay committed to sobriety.146 Not without a note 
of critique, Nolan chronicles these efforts as part of the “deliberately and 
consciously” orchestrated “theater” of the model, in which the judge adopts 
a caring persona in order to build trust and produce certain therapeutic 
 
 144  Cotton, supra note 136, at 72–74.  
 145  Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131–32; Miller, supra note 30, at 423. 
 146  NOLAN, supra note 34, at 11, 72–73, 101–02. The judges do this by studying defendants’ 
files in advance of court dates and then demonstrating extensive knowledge of their case histories 
from hearing to hearing. Id. at 73.  
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outcomes.147 However, even if the role is scripted, as Nolan suggests, judges 
who have had drug court assignments report a feeling of liberation at being 
able to “mak[e] a difference.”148 Because of the role they are asked to play, 
drug court judges are invested in the success of the treatment regimen,149 
rather than resigned to performing a bureaucratic function such as arraigning 
200 cases in one day150 or, in their words, issuing sentences that might as 
well have been programmed by a computer.151  
If re-naming the goal of adjudication affects judicial behavior—as the 
drug court model demonstrates is possible—a cyclical loop also becomes 
possible in which behavior affects judicial attitudes. This is the thrust of a 
counterintuitive insight from social psychology: “the primacy of behavior on 
attitudes.”152 One might assume the opposite—that attitudes predict 
behavior. But behavioral science literature over the past century has 
consistently found, to the contrary, “that people’s behavior is often more 
predictive of their attitudes than their attitudes are of their behavior.”153  
Victor Quintanilla relies on this research to suggest that, if judges are 
required to mold their behavior to positively affect socially disadvantaged 
users of the courts, their attitudes toward those groups will shift 
accordingly.154 And, indeed, the drug court model may illustrate the potency 
of this theory. A survey of 355 judges conducted by Deborah Chase and the 
Honorable Peggy Fulton highlights the power of simple behavioral changes 
to impact judicial attitudes.155 In their study, drug court judges were 
compared to judges who preside over traditional dockets and evaluated on, 
among other factors, their attitudes toward litigants.156 The drug court judges 
 
 147  Id. at 72–75. 
 148  Id. at 108–10. 
 149  Nolan discusses the example of a judge approaching a defendant’s employer to help him get 
his job back. This kind of judicial conduct has been criticized for overreaching, but also lauded for 
offering needed assistance to a defendant beyond the four corners of a case. Id. at 95.  
 150  See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 135.  
 151  NOLAN, supra note 34, at 105 (quoting a judge who argues against mandatory sentencing 
schemes in traditional courts because of their machine-like nature). 
 152  Victor D. Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design, 121 PA. ST. L. REV. 745, 803 
(2017).  
 153  Id. at 774; see also John T. Cacioppo et al., Rudimentary Determinants of Attitudes II: Arm 
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APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (1980). 
 154  Quintanilla, supra note 152, at 789–803 (making recommendations to apply a human-
centered civil justice design to the court system).  
 155  Deborah Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, The Best Seat in the House: The Court Assignment 
and Judicial Satisfaction, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 209 (2009).  
 156  Id. at 221.  
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were significantly “more positive in their attitudes toward the litigants than 
the other judges.”157 Fifty-one percent of drug court judges reported positive 
attitudes toward litigants on metrics such as the litigants’ motivation and 
ability to address their own problems, while only fifteen percent of judges 
on traditional dockets felt the same way.158 This research suggests that 
charging judges with the duty to transform their courtroom conduct may 
prompt an attitudinal shift that, cyclically, reinforces the problem-solving 
mission of the court. 
Applying this theory to the civil justice system, a civil problem-solving 
court might exploit the drug court principle of “naming” to immunize judges 
against capture by powerful classes of litigants. In the model I envision, a 
civil problem-solving court would name its purpose as addressing a social 
problem, and judges would then intentionally tailor their courtroom practices 
to protect the rights of vulnerable parties. If social psychology proves 
prescient, behavioral changes among judges may ultimately spur attitudinal 
changes, which would strengthen the capacity of the court to solve the named 
social problem. As will be discussed in the next subsection, field work I 
conducted in an experimental Housing Conditions Court (HCC) in the 
District of Columbia illustrates how these sequential effects might unfold.159 
3. The Naming Function and the HCC 
Launched in 2011, the HCC is an experimental calendar housed within 
the District of Columbia’s Superior Court system and designed to adjudicate 
affirmative habitability claims.160 Essentially, the HCC has taken 
substandard housing claims out of the exclusive domain of the court’s 
traditional landlord-tenant division—which is besieged by all of the systemic 
conditions described in Part II—and created an alternative venue for tenants 
seeking repairs. 
The HCC’s specialized docket was created in the wake of a 2008 series 
of articles published by the Washington Post that exposed the substandard 
condition of local rental housing.161 The series documented “decrepit and 
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 158  Id.  
 159  The methods and results of this field work are described and analyzed extensively elsewhere. 
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 160  See Zoe Tillman, Housing Conditions Calendar Creates a New Forum for Tenants, NAT’L 
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 161  See Debbie Cenziper & Sarah Cohen, A Failure in Enforcement: Agency’s Ineffectiveness 
Has Helped Landlords Profit from Neglect, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Cenziper & 
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dangerous” conditions at properties across the city, and chided the local 
enforcement agency, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 
for willfully ignoring tenant complaints at the expense of public health and 
safety.162 While the District’s existing landlord-tenant branch is ostensibly 
tasked with adjudicating substandard housing issues, it, too, was deemed 
ineffective in combating this entrenched social problem.163 
On its face, the HCC, in many ways, resembles a classic informal 
tribunal.164 Formal testimony, the rules of evidence, and most procedural 
norms are eschewed by the court.165 With the exception of service of 
process—which the HCC requires—judges enforce very few of the 
courtroom formalities typically observed in traditional courts.166 One might 
expect, then, that the HCC would fall victim to the same corporate capture 
that other small claims and informal tribunals have experienced. However, 
the court has interrupted this cycle with the same rhetorical device employed 
by drug courts: naming the court’s purpose as solving an identifiable social 
problem. 
The Administrative Order that created the HCC named the express and 
exclusive mission of the court as solving the social issue of substandard 
housing. The Order identified the impetus for the new court as “a need to 
quickly address conditions which constitute violations of the District of 
Columbia’s housing code . . . .”167 Regarding the decision to develop the 
HCC as a specialized calendar outside the existing court structure, the 
Administrative Order reiterated its intent to “expedite actions for 
enforcement of housing code regulations.”168 This targeted emphasis—
focusing on one particular class of litigants whose rights have typically gone 
 
Cohen, Failure in Enforcement], http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2008/03/10/ST2008031003243.html (detailing the failure of the Department of 
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(May 4, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2008/05/03/ST2008050302298.html (describing how the Department of 
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs used its multimillion-dollar repair fund to support a computer 
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/13/AR2008081303650.html 
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 164  See Steinberg, supra note 17, at 1062. 
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Calendar 1 (Apr. 28, 2010). 
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unaddressed—is quite different from the broader civil court’s neutral 
mission to apply and interpret the law.169 
The HCC’s naming function had a powerful effect on the court’s early 
development. While the authorizing Administrative Order did not establish 
the HCC as aligned with any particular philosophy of adjudication, the 
founding judge and others began to discuss the court in public forums as 
embracing a problem-solving style.170 The judge who led the court’s initial 
efforts held town hall style community meetings promoting the HCC as a 
“fix it” court that “gets repairs done.”171 A veteran tenant advocate echoed 
the problem-solving nature of the HCC, saying, “[i]t’s very ‘roll up your 
sleeves and get the job done’”—a nod to the court’s focus on finding and 
remedying housing code violations.172 
The HCC’s named purpose also appears to have impacted the judicial 
approach to case management and dispute resolution. While the HCC does 
not have the case volume of many urban landlord-tenant courts it is still 
recognizable as a system of mass justice due to several defining features: 
Parties wait for up to three hours for their cases to be called, hearings are 
held in a particularly public manner, and most case events occupy no more 
than eight to ten minutes of the court’s time.173 Given these characteristics, 
one might predict that the HCC depends on hallway settlements to conclude 
most or many proceedings. However, the HCC has turned the typical model 
of judicial triage on its head: Rather than steering tenants toward quick and 
unmonitored agreements, an active judge works to ensure that legitimate 
grievances are investigated and addressed—not swept aside by tainted 
methods of early case resolution. 
HCC cases commence in the same way they do in many traditional civil 
justice matters—with an initial hearing before the judge at which the parties 
air their complaints. Unlike in a typical housing court, however, the HCC 
judge does not automatically urge hallway settlement as a means of 
 
 169  See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 170  See Jessica Gould, Town Hall Airs Tenant Concerns, NW. CURRENT, Aug. 4, 2010, at 1 
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2011) (on file with author).  
 172  Tillman, supra note 170.  
 173  The HCC’s docket is held once a week for half a day. Based on my field observations, during 
the three- to four-hour docket, approximately twenty to twenty-five cases are heard. Steinberg, 
supra note 17, at 1063. 
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winnowing their dockets. Instead, the judge presses the landlord to respond 
to the tenant’s allegations, and if an admission of liability is not obtained, 
orders a housing inspector to investigate the property. By concentrating 
judicial resources on fact-gathering rather than early case resolution, pro se 
parties receive encouragement to remain engaged in the court process. 
Indeed, in my longitudinal review of seventy-three HCC case matters, only 
six percent were ultimately resolved by settlement.174 
In the HCC, this change in judicial case management considerably 
expands tenant access to available civil remedies. My longitudinal data 
revealed that, when claims of housing code violations were investigated, 
ninety-seven percent of tenant cases resulted in at least one substantiated 
allegation.175 While a tribunal dominated by out-of-court settlements is likely 
to leave valid grievances unaddressed due to the power gap between 
landlords and tenants, a judicial focus on surfacing meritorious claims 
instead lays the groundwork for the enforcement of appropriate remedies. 
One might imagine other areas—principally consumer debt—where a 
specialized docket might also redefine its mission to confront a social issue 
that has been impervious to traditional adjudication. Anna Carpenter 
describes this as a “principles over procedures” approach.176 The redefined 
objective need not involve a new remedy, but could focus squarely on rights 
protection for a vulnerable class of litigants. Judges would then adjust their 
conduct to meet the expectations of the forum, but with a different-than-usual 
beneficiary: the less powerful party. In this way, the core drug court principle 
of “naming” might form the first building block of a civil problem-solving 
model. 
B. Attacking Information Asymmetry 
A second core principle of drug courts is collaboration with 
interdisciplinary actors. In a drug court, the judge is the head of the treatment 
team, but regularly relies on the expertise of social workers, probation 
officers, and addiction specialists to design the treatment plan and motivate 
the defendant to stay engaged in the program.177 
In the civil justice system, the borrowed principle of interdisciplinary 
collaboration might form the second building block of a private law problem-
solving model. While the civil courts do not require specialized expertise in 
designing an alternative remedy, a partnership with outside government 
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 175  Id. at 1071 (finding that the housing inspector substantiated at least one allegation in all but 
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actors could prove useful in facilitating access to, and enforcement of, 
existing remedies. In particular, incorporating the expertise and investigatory 
skills of regulatory actors into civil proceedings can address the information 
asymmetry that results from lopsided representation. 
1. Information Asymmetry in Traditional Courts.  
Systemic lack of counsel, and specifically lopsided representation, is 
responsible for many of the poor justice outcomes in the civil courts. 
Powerful private actors such as property owners and debt buyers weaponize 
procedure to suppress pro se evidence by objecting to their collection or 
authentication methods.178 And these same actors can simultaneously dodge 
compliance with legal requirements, such as personal knowledge of the debt 
owed, that, if adhered to, would make their claims harder to bring.179 Pro se 
parties lack the power to overcome a represented opponent’s procedural 
wrangling in order to propel their case information and arguments in front of 
a judge.180 As a result, judicial decision making in the civil justice system is 
often infected by information asymmetry, leading to skewed results.181 
2. Interdisciplinary Collaboration and Information Asymmetry 
The drug court principle of interdisciplinary collaboration has great 
potential in the civil sphere for overcoming the information asymmetry that 
arises from lopsided representation. The HCC, for example, has adopted the 
problem-solving tactic of appointing an independent government actor to 
conduct fact investigations. As in most civil courts, the majority of cases in 
the HCC involve unrepresented parties and just under half involve 
asymmetrical representation, with one party represented and the other not.182 
If the HCC mimicked other civil tribunals, the unavailability of counsel 
would greatly complicate tenants’ efforts to navigate procedures and present 
evidence, ultimately leading to an under-enforcement of rights. Instead, the 
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inspector is deputized as responsible for providing the court with important 
and accurate case information, therefore unburdening the pro se party from 
the task of doing so. 
The HCC’s collaboration model involves a strategic partnership with 
the District of Columbia’s Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 
the governmental body charged with code inspections.183 A designated city 
housing inspector has been assigned to the HCC and is dispatched to inspect 
every unit in which a dispute exists over the presence of code violations.184 
The inspector is an institutionalized part of the court, and is charged with 
reporting back to the judge on the quality of the unit.185 The inspector may 
visit the unit only once, or may visit several times, depending on the 
intractability of the party conflict.186 By providing the judge with information 
about the parties’ out-of-court conduct, the inspector remediates the 
information asymmetry that so often taints proceedings without counsel. 
3. Three Informational Dimensions to the Interdisciplinary Role 
As is the case with all HCC procedures, the inspector’s role is not 
formalized, or even made known, by written rule.187 And yet my field 
research reveals that HCC inspectors have a breadth and depth to their 
position that arguably even exceeds the standing of interdisciplinary actors 
in drug courts. Indeed, the inspector appears to occupy three distinct 
informational functions in the HCC, which together suggest guiding 
principles for the interdisciplinary component of a civil problem-solving 
court. 
First, the inspector fulfills the adjudicatory function of determining the 
merit of the tenant’s claims. Second, the inspector fulfills the regulatory 
function of inspecting for law violations not raised by the tenant. And last, 
the inspector fulfills the managerial function of facilitating communication 
between the relevant system players to advance the enforcement of remedies. 
Although the inspector’s role in the HCC evokes the role that probation 
officers, social workers, and drug treatment providers play in drug courts, it 
is squarely tailored to address the specific process failures that plague the 
civil justice system—and is not ordered around implementation of an 
alternative remedy, as is the bedrock of interdisciplinary collaboration in 
drug courts. 
The inspector’s adjudicatory function in the HCC is carried out by 
evaluating the merit of the tenant’s claims. Armed with the tenant’s 
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complaint, inspectors conduct an initial visit to the premises, investigate the 
alleged housing code violations, and convey their findings to the court both 
in writing and orally.188 In this way, a tenant’s claims are either substantiated 
or invalidated. This fact-finding role can be enormously beneficial for pro se 
tenants, who may be unable to prove a cockroach infestation, for instance, 
without the inspector’s observation of physical evidence.189 
As part of the adjudicatory function, inspectors also play a crucial role 
in determining mixed questions of law and fact. When a property owner 
disputes liability for a broken shower, for example, the inspector makes a 
determination as to whether structural conditions or the tenant’s misconduct 
is the primary cause for the substandard condition.190 Interdisciplinary 
cooperation is leveraged to dissolve the influence of procedural and 
substantive know-how on the outcome of civil matters, and to produce 
information that is reliable and relevant to the court’s decision-making. 
Turning to the inspector’s regulatory function, this part of the role is 
fulfilled by surveilling homes for the presence of code violations the tenant 
did not allege. That is, the inspector does not simply operate within the 
adversarial framework of the litigation, in which the issues are confined to 
those raised by the parties, but instead pursues full compliance with the 
housing code.191 This regulatory role is critical to reducing the role of 
information asymmetry in producing unbalanced civil justice outcomes. 
Indeed, in my field research, thirty-five percent of defective conditions 
addressed by HCC judges were independently discovered by the inspector 
and not raised by the tenant.192 In this way, the inspectors supplant some of 
the informational expertise that attorneys traditionally offer: They bring 
value to the case, in part, by identifying issues and sources of relief not 
previously understood by the client. 
Finally, the housing inspector fulfills a managerial function in the HCC. 
Cases in the HCC do not conclude upon a finding of liability; instead, 
continuous hearings are held until the property owner completes repairs.193 
The inspector’s managerial role focuses on this enforcement period. In 
essence, the inspector’s position in the field is utilized to gather information 
about conflicts that arise as the parties work to address the judge’s finding of 
liability. As illustration, at one HCC hearing, a tenant expressed 
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dissatisfaction with progress on repairs, and the landlord himself admitted to 
uncertainty over the quality of his contractor’s work, noting that he did not 
have the expertise to evaluate his contractor’s assurances that repairs were 
complete.194 The inspector visited the unit to determine the adequacy of 
repairs, and brought the information back to the judge; following this 
inspection, the parties reached agreement over the scope of needed work. 
This ongoing managerial function is key to facilitating an exchange of 
information among system actors so that judicial directives are fulfilled. 
The inspector’s managerial role comes closest to replicating the 
function of interdisciplinary actors in drug courts. Probation officers and 
treatment professionals meet regularly to review a defendant’s progress in 
treatment, and to communicate drug testing results to the judge. The 
defendant’s engagement in treatment is closely monitored, and rewards or 
sanctions may be doled out depending on nature of the reports from 
interdisciplinary collaborators. Similarly, the inspector in the HCC serves as 
a liaison to the court on the parties’ activities and allows the judge to calibrate 
punitive measures against noncompliant landlords, if appropriate.195 In the 
civil problem-solving setting, however, the inspector’s investigations 
contribute critical case information to determinations of liability as well as 
enforcement. It is this aspect of their role that does the most to address the 
information asymmetry that so often subverts the claims-making process for 
pro se parties. 
4. Challenges to Interdisciplinary Collaboration 
It is important to acknowledge that while interdisciplinary collaboration 
is a powerful tool that a developing civil problem-solving court might put to 
use in battling the impact of systemic lack of counsel on justice outcomes, 
the role is rife with complications and challenges that must be considered. 
Most significantly, an inspector’s competence and neutrality is central to the 
effective undertaking of the role. The court and the parties must trust that the 
inspector is thorough in examining the unit, objective in identifying 
violations and assigning blame, and balanced in negotiating interparty 
conflict.196 In addition, the inspector’s role can become so dominant as to 
usurp judicial power and undermine party autonomy. This latter concern may 
threaten an independent judiciary, and would be particularly worrisome 
where the interdisciplinary actor is not considered impartial.197 
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The evolving distrust of guardians ad litem (GALs) in family courts is 
evidence of the perils that can accompany an independent investigator’s role. 
The GAL model in family courts involves the appointment of a third-party 
actor who conducts investigations into the “best interests of the child.”198 The 
results of the GAL’s investigation are then communicated to the judge to 
inform the court’s ultimate decisions on custody, visitation, and mandated 
mental health or substance abuse treatment.199 When the model rose to 
prominence in the 1970s, it was seen as a significant safeguard for the best 
interests of children.200 Now, the model is often harshly critiqued, with 
concerns raised over GAL’s broad investigatory powers, minimal training, 
invasion into family privacy, and selective reporting of child abuse.201 
Without mechanisms to ensure accountability and impartiality, the role of an 
independent inspector may at best be ineffective, and at worst corrupted. 
Challenges like those that now accompany the GAL role must be 
recognized, and were an inspector’s role to be scaled as part of a broadly 
adopted civil problem-solving framework, may even prove unavoidable. 
However, the interdisciplinary model also offers unrealized promise in 
dissolving the information asymmetry that results from the clash of 
procedural complexity and systemic lack of counsel in the civil justice 
system. The inspector assigned to the HCC during the study period was lifted 
from a local code agency widely criticized for incompetence and even 
corruption,202 and yet has been praised for excellence and trustworthiness in 
her work with the court.203 This suggests that a court’s organizational 
dynamics may play a significant role in creating and preserving an effective 
interdisciplinary partnership. To avoid reinforcing existing power 
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hierarchies, judicial appraisal of the interdisciplinary actor’s neutrality and 
competence must be carefully carried out. 
5. Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Consumer Debt Cases  
Interdisciplinary collaboration in the consumer debt setting cannot 
mimic the HCC’s model since there is no obvious local agency available to 
conduct on-the-ground investigations in this sphere. However, the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which 
created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and broadened 
oversight of the debt collection industry, creates a fresh opportunity to 
contemplate data sharing as the interdisciplinary mechanism for targeting 
illegal debt collection practices within a problem-solving framework.204 
Since its inception in 2010, the CFPB has amassed national data on 
unscrupulous debt collectors and made use of its authority to prosecute 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices. For example, in 2013, the CFPB 
successfully sued Cash America, one of the largest payday lenders in the 
United States, for various collection abuses, including the robo-signing of 
court documents. The lawsuit resulted in a $14 million refund to the affected 
consumers.205 In addition, in 2015, the CFPB filed suit against two 
companies that bought improperly vetted personal data from loan 
applications and then re-sold the data to fraudulent third-party debt buyers, 
thus subjecting millions of consumers to unlawful collection.206 
While the CFPB has no involvement in individual collection actions, its 
data could be enormously beneficial to problem-solving judges. To shape its 
enforcement priorities, the CFPB maintains a “complaint database,” a 
sizeable and organized information repository that invites consumers to 
report on their challenges in the marketplace.207 Currently, the CFPB’s 
existing data is not shared through any formal mechanism with local courts 
and judges. Similarly, local courts do little to share with the CFPB the 
egregious collection practices they encounter on a regular basis. An 
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informational feedback loop between local judges and the CFPB could 
effectively serve as the interdisciplinary collaboration prong of a consumer 
problem-solving court. 
A snapshot of the CFPB’s database reveals a high volume of complaints 
that mirror many of the issues arising in everyday litigation. For instance, the 
December 2016 monthly complaint report reveals that thirty-nine percent of 
complaints submitted about debt collection have to do with “phantom debt,” 
or debt the consumers allege is not owed.208 In addition, the database tracks 
which debt buyers top the average monthly complaint list.209 These statistics 
could inform the local courts which cases are appropriate for problem-
solving scrutiny in the form of increased judicial monitoring. 
At its best, a consumer problem-solving model would build reciprocal 
communication channels between courts and the CFPB, so that not only are 
judges apprised of the activities of known law-breakers, but the CFPB can 
expand its data collection to include case information from the courts. A 
formalized informational feedback loop would encourage judges to 
contribute case data to the CFPB’s information repository. Local case data 
would expand the volume of reliable information maintained by the CFPB—
currently limited to consumer complaints—which would then concomitantly 
grow the data accessible to other judges. 
The interdisciplinary model proposed, premised on the exchange of 
data, and especially if coupled with curated information analysis and 
presentation from both sides, could greatly assist the courts in attacking 
information asymmetry. While consumers are often unaware of a debt 
collector’s national practices, judges attuned to such trends might use data to 
make informed decisions about when to impose a demand for more evidence 
or require additional court monitoring. A “big data” approach to judicial 
information gathering may not be as finely tuned as case-specific fact 
investigation, but certainly could advance more vigorous scrutiny of habitual 
bad actors. The consumer example demonstrates the elasticity of problem-
solving methods and the flexibility of the model to adapt its core components 
to a variety of existing circumstances and actors. 
C. Motivating Liable Parties to Perform 
A strong and central judicial role is the third element of a drug court. 
As Greg Berman and John Feinblatt have written, drug courts “make 
aggressive use of a largely untapped resource: the power of judges to 
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promote compliance with court orders.”210 
In civil justice matters, this essential principle might form the final 
building block of a problem-solving court. Much like in drug courts, a civil 
problem-solving judge would be placed at the center of dispute resolution. 
Through the exercise of both formal and informal authority, this reimagined 
judge would leverage the findings of the interdisciplinary actor to actively 
promote the enforcement of existing civil remedies. The problem-solving 
judging task evokes a small-scale version of structural reform litigation in 
which performance is eked out over a long stretch of time through an arduous 
process of setting modest benchmarks and then relying on the judge’s 
authority to hold the parties accountable for progress. 
1. Judicial Monitoring and Forms of Authority 
If a civil problem-solving model is different from its criminal 
counterpart in its engagement with liability, it closely mirrors the drug court 
example in its monitoring function. In the HCC, upon the inspector’s 
discovery of defective housing conditions, judges schedule hearings at two- 
to three-week intervals to monitor the property owner’s repairs.211 This 
monitoring role takes a simple yet consistent form: Following a report on the 
status of repairs, the judge engages the parties in dialogue, surfaces barriers 
to enforcement, and stakes out specific obligations that the parties must 
fulfill at both interim and long-term deadlines.212 
In one characteristic illustration, the tenant and property owner bickered 
in court over the proper way to repair a broken window.213 The judge ordered 
the landlord to hire a window contractor within four days, have a plan for 
repairs in two and a half weeks, and clearly communicate that plan to the 
tenant.214 To be sure, the tenant’s conduct may be the target of judicial 
enforcement efforts as well. Where a landlord complained that a tenant had 
obstructed access to the property on the scheduled day for repairs, the judge 
issued a directive instructing the tenant to vacate certain rooms in the unit at 
particular times.215 In my longitudinal study of the HCC’s substantive 
outcomes, nearly eighty percent of substantiated violations were ultimately 
repaired, lending credibility to the theory that judicial monitoring can 
motivate liable parties to perform legal obligations that have traditionally 
gone under-enforced.216 
In the consumer setting, a judicial monitoring regime could be informed 
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by the CFPB’s national data and imposed against collectors with a reported 
history of unfair or deceptive practices. One might imagine a judge requiring 
suspect debt collectors to appear in court and provide reliable evidence to 
support the legitimacy of their collection efforts. Such monitoring would 
eliminate rushed default judgments and force creditors to face early judicial 
interrogation on the veracity of their claims. The critical nature of judicial 
engagement in pre-hearing proceedings is supported by Colleen Shanahan’s 
research, which demonstrates that “access-friendly” judges—who strive to 
reach substantive decisions and avoid defaults—produce more favorable 
outcomes for vulnerable litigants.217 
While some exercise of formal judicial authority is required to manage 
power imbalances and motivate party performance, the drug court example 
demonstrates that charismatic authority is also a critical element of a 
problem-solving judging model. Formal authority bestows on the judge the 
convening power to hold continuous hearings, and provides the judge with a 
set of sticks that can be used to punish a noncompliant party.218 For instance, 
HCC judges may schedule additional enforcement hearings or impose 
sanctions where the conduct of property owners is particularly egregious. A 
problem-solving judge may be reluctant to rely too heavily on the exercise 
of formal authority, however, as a heavy-handed approach may undermine 
the cooperative spirit of the enterprise. This is certainly true in drug courts, 
where judges often hold back on imposing punishments, such as jail time, 
even when a defendant underperforms in treatment.219 
Underpinning the use of formal authority, then, is the judge’s effective 
exercise of charismatic authority. Coined by Max Weber, charismatic 
authority is not derived from law or tradition, but rather from the force of the 
judge’s character or personality.220 Drug court judges are known to exhibit 
tremendous charismatic authority, often using plainspoken language and 
expressive gestures to develop a relationship with defendants that, they hope, 
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will later translate to completion of the treatment regimen. HCC judges 
demonstrate the potential of charismatic authority in the civil justice sphere 
by engaging the parties in similar blunt-but-respectful dialogue about their 
actions. Like in drug courts, HCC judges adopt a folksy persona and largely 
choose to speak directly to parties, even when lawyers are present.221 
Timothy Casey argues that the charismatic authority so essential to the 
problem-solving judging model makes for an “inherently unstable” regime, 
as a tribunal relying on an extraordinary and dedicated judge will last “only 
as long as the life or reign of the individual leader.”222 However, charismatic 
authority does not have to manifest itself in theatrical gestures or heroic 
individuals; it can emerge in subtler ways and nonetheless be influential. 
For instance, HCC judges forge a more intimate connection with the 
parties by maintaining their accessibility outside the courtroom. A judge may 
say to a tenant, “Here is my number in chambers. Call me directly if the 
landlord does not show up.”223 The judges also go to great lengths to 
accommodate parties who face barriers to case participation. At one hearing, 
the judge announced in open court that the landlord had just given birth and 
would therefore be conferenced into the proceeding on speaker phone.224 
Even when parties fail to appear for hearings without notifying the court in 
advance, the HCC judge typically picks up the phone and attempts to include 
the missing litigant in the hearing.225 These gestures are small, but a flexible 
judicial style is an embodiment of charismatic authority, and it may later 
influence parties to heed the judge’s directives.226 
2. Challenges and Opportunities with Judicial Monitoring 
A challenge of the problem-solving judging style is striking the right 
balance of formal and charismatic authority. Overuse of sanctions may lead 
to backlash against the model, with parties less inclined to participate in the 
continuous enforcement hearings. Indeed, fourteen percent of property 
owners in my longitudinal review of HCC cases disappeared from the 
process without making repairs, revealing that paper sanctions may actually 
expel a party from the court’s orbit.227 At the same time, an under-reliance 
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on formal authority may result in enforcement efforts that are slow and 
plodding, with the court’s convening power not robust enough to compel 
performance. In one HCC matter on its eighth hearing, I observed a judge 
reprimanding the landlord for her lackadaisical approach to making 
repairs—and yet sanctions were still not imposed.228 
Compounding the difficulty of striking the right balance is that first 
generation drug court judges are known to bring an enthusiasm and energy 
to the role that future judges may not always match.229 Therefore, like in any 
organizational setting, training, management, and incentives are likely to be 
critical components of problem-solving judging. Drug courts, for example, 
employ regular evaluation and peer review to encourage positive judicial 
performance.230 These are measures that a civil problem-solving court might 
do well to consider in developing an effective and exportable judging model. 
Despite the inherent challenges, problem-solving experimentation has 
the potential to ignite much-needed innovation in the judicial role, a benefit 
that may accrue to other sectors of the civil justice system. Traditional 
conceptions of the role of the judge have been slow to evolve through 
common law or ethical canons.231 The duty to remain impartial remains 
largely equated with passive judicial conduct.232 Problem-solving courts 
function as sites of experimentation where judges can play an active role, 
collaborate with non-court actors, and seek fair outcomes. Indeed, the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct allows for the regulation of problem-solving 
judges through specialized local court rules, exempting them from some of 
the confining strictures of traditional judging and enabling an active judicial 
role as part of a problem-solving process.233 If adopted in the civil courts, the 
problem-solving framework could have reverberating effects throughout the 
judiciary by piloting new models of judging that ultimately can be 
implemented more broadly.234 
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IV 
RESPONDING TO CRITIQUES OF CRIMINAL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 
Having made the case that a civil problem-solving theory has the 
capacity to address some of the unique and pervasive structural failings 
present in the civil justice system, this Part responds to some of the common 
critiques of drug courts and considers whether the same critiques might apply 
in the civil setting. I conclude that private law problem-solving courts may 
sidestep many of the pitfalls of the drug court model. 
First, a civil problem-solving court does not engage in 
“responsibilization,” in which the onus is on a disadvantaged individual to 
modify his behavior rather than on the government to improve inequality. 
Second, a civil problem-solving model avoids “net widening,” or over-
enforcement of the targeted behavior, as no alternative remedy is imposed 
against the offending actor. And finally, the prospect of diminished 
procedural protections—a significant concern in drug courts—is less 
troublesome in the civil justice context since parties are afforded few 
constitutional rights in need of protection and there are hardly any lawyers 
to enforce them. 
A. Responsibilization 
Some commentators object to drug courts as embracing a 
“responsibilization” strategy.235 These commentators find it troubling that 
the drug court model holds the defendant accountable for treating his 
addiction while letting the government off the hook for failing to provide 
adequate access to education, job training, housing and health care in the first 
instance.236 On this critique, the defendant’s addiction is viewed as the 
product of societal failings and compulsory treatment is simply one more 
measure that puts undue pressure on the individual to fix his own problems, 
despite forces out of his control that may make this difficult.237 Victoria 
Malkin argues that, in this way, drug courts are reformulating the social 
contract between the state and certain citizens. In her words, “[t]he state and 
social responsibility is now replaced with empowerment talk . . . individual 
responsibility and participation.”238 Eric Miller argues that the treatment 
regimen is less aimed at promoting good health and more aimed at regulating 
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the defendant’s conduct. He asserts that drug court judges are not managing 
medical opportunities, but are rather promoting discipline-as-treatment.239 
For these commentators, the responsibilization paradigm is paternalistic 
and morally bankrupt. They believe addiction services, in addition to other 
government benefits, should be offered outside the judicial system and 
without the accompanying threat of punishment. Instead, drug court judges 
go to great lengths to coerce treatment and mold the defendant’s conduct to 
conform to particular social norms. Richard Boldt criticizes problem-solving 
courts as a paternalistic form of social control, highlighting frequent urine 
testing, parenting classes, and detailed reporting to the court as “potentially 
more invasive and coercive than a traditional sentence of incarceration.”240 
James Nolan depicts drug court judges as regularly engaged in “extra-
adjudicative activism” to promote treatment goals, including meddling in a 
defendant’s work and personal life, and employing “tough love” measures 
such as brief jail stints241—all in an effort to induce a defendant to 
“voluntarily” engage in the treatment program. 
The responsibilization critique is a valid one and situates drug courts 
within a larger movement to attach onerous conditions to antipoverty 
programs. As the most prominent example, welfare recipients do not 
automatically receive benefits based on need, but must earn those benefits 
through work and job training contributions.242 Welfare reform has been 
heavily critiqued as adding to the burden of poverty and complicating access 
to government services, and similar notes are rung in the compulsory 
treatment model.243 
Further legitimizing the responsibilization critique is the contention that 
the drug courts’ strong-arm tactics work at cross purposes to successful 
treatment. Policy experts point out that drug courts are premised on two 
contradictory theories: the “disease model,” which understands that addicts 
are compulsive and use drugs despite negative consequences; and the 
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“rational actor” model, which presumes that a defendant can overcome 
addiction if faced with sufficiently negative consequences.244 The Drug 
Policy Alliance argues that these “dueling models” are ineffective because 
they “result in people being ‘treated’ through a medical lens while the 
symptoms of their condition—chiefly, the inability to maintain abstinence—
are addressed through a penal one.”245 Some social science research also 
disputes the notion that drug treatment can be successful if performed under 
duress,246 which adds additional heft to the argument that responsibilization 
is an unproductive strategy. 
The civil problem-solving theory I propose not only sidesteps the 
responsibilization critique but directly responds to it. Instead of subjecting 
the disadvantaged individual to intrusive governmental monitoring and 
behavior modification, the HCC places the onus on the more powerful 
private party to come into compliance with the law. On the civil model, low-
income parties gain access to much-needed government services, such as 
housing inspections, that are virtually inaccessible without the court’s 
facilitation.247 There are no contingencies attached to the receipt of 
government benefits within the civil problem-solving framework, and no 
system of carrots and sticks to ensure that services are utilized in a particular 
manner. While drug courts chase treatment goals by foisting enormous 
responsibility on individuals to regulate their own behavior, their civil 
counterparts relieve vulnerable parties from the personal persistence that 
would otherwise be necessary to goad regulatory and private actors into 
meeting their legal obligations. 
B. Net Widening 
Another major critique of the drug court model is that it can result in 
net widening, or an unintended increase in criminal justice system 
involvement.248 This net widening may occur if drug courts result in more 
overall prosecution of low-level crimes, and may also occur if drug courts 
result in more jail time than defendants would have received by virtue of 
traditional prosecution.249 
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Adriaan Lanni discusses the potential for net widening of prosecutions, 
noting that drug courts generally address low-level, quality-of-life offenses 
that were previously left unprosecuted.250 The concern, shared by others, is 
that minor crimes may be prosecuted instead of ignored if local law 
enforcement begins to view the judicial system—rather than social services 
agencies—as integral to the therapeutic process.251 As one concrete example 
of a drug court ensnaring a much wider population than perhaps originally 
intended, one judge in Colorado contends that the number of drug cases in 
Denver nearly tripled two years after the implementation of its drug court.252 
Drug courts can also result in net widening if the penalty for 
unsuccessful treatment outstrips the punishment the defendant would have 
faced in a traditional court. The Drug Policy Alliance claims, for instance, 
that “people who do not complete drug court may actually face longer 
sentences—up to two to five times longer, according to one study—than if 
they had been conventionally sentenced in the first place.”253 Although 
admittedly an outlier, NPR’s This American Life ran a two-part story on 
Lindsey Dills, a seventeen-year-old first-time offender who was diverted to 
drug court after forging two checks totaling one hundred dollars.254 Due to 
failed drug tests during treatment, she served multiple jail stints, at least one 
of them in solitary confinement for ninety days.255 Local criminal defense 
attorneys confirmed that, in the traditional criminal justice system, she would 
have likely been sentenced to probation, at most.256 
In some respects, the phenomenon of net widening may be present in a 
private law problem-solving model as well. Certainly, a court such as the 
HCC expands enforcement of the housing code. However, context is critical 
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in considering whether net widening is harmful or beneficial to a system of 
justice. The criminal justice system is already expansive and 
disproportionately brings to bear the state’s greatest power on low-income 
communities of color. Any alternative program or court that broadens the 
reach of the criminal justice system should therefore be viewed with 
suspicion and implemented with the utmost care. 
A civil problem-solving court, by contrast, would not exacerbate the 
negative impact of state power on already overburdened groups. Instead, it 
uses government resources to prevent powerful private parties from 
exercising unchecked power over the lives of vulnerable individuals. As 
Kathryn Sabbeth has argued persuasively, the danger that private parties 
pose to low-income communities is often discounted, when in fact, it can be 
as corrosive as the abuse of state power.257 Through their actions, property 
owners and debt collectors can destabilize a family’s shelter, wreck financial 
security, and limit future housing and employment opportunities.258 The civil 
justice system has fared poorly in curtailing the power of private actors, and 
a problem-solving framework offers one way of leveling the playing field. 
Net widening in a drug court is especially suspect because both the 
defined “problem” (addiction) and the “remedy” (treatment) involve 
controversial moralizing that may unjustly punish the very population it aims 
to protect. In the civil setting, the problem and the remedy are already 
recognized by law, which helps insulate the model from the net-widening 
critique. The HCC, for instance, targets offending individuals and conduct 
within the bounds of existing law. While drug courts insist on a standard of 
conduct not otherwise required by law—coerced sobriety—the HCC stays 
squarely within the lines drawn by legislatures and courts, exacting no 
extralegal price from property owners for their bad faith conduct. The HCC 
fills a process void, but does not expand the substantive power of tenants or 
reduce the agency of landlords. 
C. Fewer Procedural Protections and Diminished Role for Counsel 
A third and final critique of the drug court model is that it results in 
fewer procedural protections for defendants and a diminished role for 
counsel. Critics point first and foremost to the erosion of constitutional rights 
for defendants who enroll in drug courts. Defendants generally must waive 
their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures 
and their Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial and to cross-examine 
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adversaries, to name just a few of the lost procedural protections.259 In 
addition, because of the “treatment team” approach, defense counsel must 
cooperate with the prosecutor and the judge instead of serving as a protective 
shield for clients.260 
Compounding the lack of procedural protections in drug courts is vast 
judicial discretion in ordering the proceedings. Even supporters of the drug 
court model acknowledge that it places “judges with extraordinary power in 
a position where they act in what they perceive to be defendants’/clients’ 
therapeutic interests but with unchecked, potentially punitive effects, 
unimpeded by principles of proportionality characteristic of a retributive 
theory of punishment.”261 Others raise concerns that the model is particularly 
worrisome because “the defendant is encouraged to waive various rights and 
disclose criminal conduct to the judge as a condition of treatment.”262  
In traditional criminal proceedings, counsel’s role is (theoretically) 
robust and intended to safeguard important procedural rights. Indeed, 
counsel’s main objective is to hold the prosecution to its burden and assist 
the defendant in avoiding self-incrimination. In drug courts, however, 
defense attorneys are coopted by the treatment team and expected to share 
information about their clients’ progress and setbacks.263 At hearings, judges 
communicate directly with defendants and reject the filtering effect of 
counsel.264 Some advocates have concluded that counsel’s role in the drug 
court setting serves more to assist the court in its enforcement efforts than to 
protect the defendant from state overreach.265 
Mae Quinn details a number of legal and ethical issues that can arise for 
public defenders practicing in drug court. From a realist perspective, she 
contends that the theoretical “team-based” approach does not exist in 
practice.266 Instead, the prosecutor has exclusive control over who is 
admitted to the court, who gets treatment, and who graduates.267 Prosecutors 
can dump weak cases in drug court, knowing that defendants cannot avail 
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themselves of procedural protections in that setting, and such a strategy is 
difficult for defense attorneys to counter.268 While cooperation among 
treatment professionals might be a utopian goal, Quinn suggests that 
counsel’s diminished role in drug courts only ends up concentrating the 
prosecutor’s power. 
While a civil problem-solving model may involve similar dynamics, in 
which procedural protections are few and an attorney does not play a 
substantial role in mitigating the power and discretion of the judge, the key 
difference lies in considering the traditional regime that serves as the 
alternative. In civil cases, constitutional protections are sparse and 
procedural rules often do not protect individuals involved in low-value mass-
justice matters. For example, many landlord-tenant and debt collection 
courts do not permit jury trials or discovery, or permit waivers of the right to 
a jury trial.269 In addition, even where procedural protections exist, there are 
hardly any lawyers available to assert them. Therefore, a problem-solving 
framework, where procedures are expressly waived in favor of a strong, 
active judge, does less to compromise due process in the civil realm simply 
because litigants in that setting start out with less to lose. While the existing 
procedural protections in civil courts may not constitute our ideal 
benchmarks, they must be taken into account when crafting alternatives. As 
Deborah Rhode has continually exhorted, when we consider the efficacy of 
any new civil access to justice intervention, we must always ask, “compared 
to what?”270 
CONCLUSION 
For at least a generation, there has been a deepening awareness of 
structural deficiencies in the civil justice system that undermine the courts’ 
ability to address major social problems. These structural forces—systemic 
lack of representation, high-volume dockets, and the corporate capture of 
small claims tribunals—often place the courts in a position of aggravating, 
rather than solving, particular social problems for defined classes of litigants. 
In the criminal setting, drug courts have responded to assembly-line 
justice by creating alternative forums in which the goal is treatment and the 
judicial role is refashioned as a tool for positive social outcomes. As the 
District of Columbia’s experimental Housing Conditions Court represents, 
problem-solving methods may be currently underutilized in the civil law 
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sphere. By naming the court’s purpose as resolving a social problem, 
employing other governmental actors to assist in investigation, and 
expanding the judicial role to include a monitoring function, the HCC 
addresses some of the unique structural issues in the civil courts and 
roadmaps a civil problem-solving model that can be employed in other areas. 
The adoption of problem-solving methods in the commonly adjudicated 
civil matters of rental housing and consumer debt would target law-breaking 
private actors for governmental monitoring, rather than further subjecting 
low-income individuals to behavioral modification, as drug courts do. 
Moreover, many of the advocacy critiques lodged against drug courts may 
be sidestepped by the civil version since fewer procedural entitlements are 
available to litigants who use the traditional civil justice system, and hardly 
any lawyers are available to enforce those that exist. 
There is an argument to be made that the problem-solving model simply 
replicates agency function under the aegis of the court.271 Perhaps courts 
should not be charged with resolving complex social problems, and a 
legislative fix that creates the ideal institutions with the appropriate funding, 
authority, and incentives to do their jobs would be a better solution.272 
Although not impervious to such critique, the civil problem-solving model 
offers a window into the possibilities of employing drug court principles to 
mitigate the structural conditions that reliably position vulnerable parties on 
the losing side of private law litigation. If the civil courts are, as they have 
become, sites of last-resort for resolving pressing social issues, a model that 
empowers judges to name and tackle the problems they encounter, 
coordinate fact-finding with interdisciplinary partners, and use their 
authority to monitor bad-faith actors, must invite serious consideration. 
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